asn.dev

Routing security

AS215434 xantho Xantho UAB

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 9 of 9 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 12 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

9 observed

Every prefix observed with AS215434 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a01:f0c0::/29RPKI validIRR28
2a01:f340::/32RPKI validIRR30
2a01:f344::/32RPKI validIRR28
2a01:f345::/32RPKI validIRR28
2a01:f346::/32RPKI validIRR28
2a01:f347::/32RPKI validIRR28
2a13:afc0::/29RPKI validIRR30
2a14:61c0::/29RPKI validIRR28
2a14:69c0::/29RPKI validIRR30

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

12 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS215434 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
2a01:f0c0::/29/29RIPENCC
2a01:f340::/32/32RIPENCC
2a01:f341::/32/32RIPENCC
2a01:f342::/32/32RIPENCC
2a01:f343::/32/32RIPENCC
2a01:f344::/32/32RIPENCC
2a01:f345::/32/32RIPENCC
2a01:f346::/32/32RIPENCC
2a01:f347::/32/32RIPENCC
2a13:afc0::/29/29RIPENCC
2a14:61c0::/29/29RIPENCC
2a14:69c0::/29/29RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

12 objects · 3 not announced

Route objects naming AS215434 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
2a01:f341::/32RIPE—LIR-LT-MBEISINA-1-MNT2026-09-23Not announced
2a01:f342::/32RIPE—LIR-LT-MBEISINA-1-MNT2026-09-23Not announced
2a01:f343::/32RIPE—LIR-LT-MBEISINA-1-MNT2026-09-23Not announced
2a01:f0c0::/29RIPE—LIR-LT-MBEISINA-1-MNT2024-11-22Announced
2a01:f340::/32RIPE—LIR-LT-MBEISINA-1-MNT2026-09-23Announced
2a01:f344::/32RIPE—LIR-LT-MBEISINA-1-MNT2026-09-23Announced
2a01:f345::/32RIPE—LIR-LT-MBEISINA-1-MNT2026-09-23Announced
2a01:f346::/32RIPE—LIR-LT-MBEISINA-1-MNT2026-09-23Announced
2a01:f347::/32RIPE—LIR-LT-MBEISINA-1-MNT2026-09-23Announced
2a13:afc0::/29RIPE—LIR-LT-UABXANTHO3-1-MNT2024-06-12Announced
2a14:61c0::/29RIPE—XANTHO-MNT2024-08-08Announced
2a14:69c0::/29RIPE—XANTHO-MNT2024-08-08Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS215434 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS216213:AS-LEXINETWORKRIPELists AS215434 as a direct member
AS60068:AS-DATAPACKET-CUSTOMERS-DEV:AS-ANON-HOST-17916RIPELists AS215434 as a direct member
AS60068:AS-DATAPACKET-CUSTOMERS-DEV:AS-LEXISTREAMRIPELists AS215434 as a direct member
AS60068:AS-DATAPACKET-CUSTOMERS:AS-LEXISTREAMRIPELists AS215434 as a direct member
AS60068:AS-LEXISTREAMRIPELists AS215434 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-11-04 19:18 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-11-04. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.