asn.dev

Routing security

AS215223 ADEKABANG-AS-ID Mohammad Raska

Unclassified RIPE Educational/Research

RPKI valid 100% 4 of 4 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 3 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

4 observed

Every prefix observed with AS215223 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a0f:85c1:3a6::/48RPKI validIRR34
2a01:e281:a300::/44RPKI validIRR34
2a14:7581:4820::/48RPKI validIRR34
2a14:7581:4821::/48RPKI validIRR29

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

3 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS215223 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
2a01:e281:a300::/40/48RIPENCC
2a0f:85c1:3a6::/48/48RIPENCC
2a14:7581:4820::/44/48RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

5 declared

This network has signed an ASPA record naming its transit providers. Each is compared against the upstreams observed in routing paths.

ASNetworkASPARouting paths
AS20473The Constant Company, LLCDeclaredObserved
AS34927iFog GmbHDeclaredObserved
AS41051Openfactory GmbHDeclaredObserved
AS44817M AlhudaDeclarednot observed
AS209022Tschajera LimitedDeclaredObserved
AS205794JINZE YANGnot declaredObserved

An observed upstream that is not declared is not necessarily a leak: our upstream inference cannot tell a transit provider from a peer seen in the same position. A declared provider that is never observed is usually a backup path.

IRR

Registered route objects

7 objects · 2 not announced

Route objects naming AS215223 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
2a01:e281:a300::/40RIPE—RASKA-MNT2024-08-31Not announced
2a14:7581:4820::/44RIPE—RH31-MNT2024-03-27Not announced
2a01:e281:a300::/44RIPE—RASKA-MNT2024-09-03Announced
2a0f:85c1:3a6::/48RIPE—RASKA-MNT2024-03-28Announced
2a14:7581:4820::/48RIPE—RASKA-MNT2024-03-27Announced
2a14:7581:4821::/48RADBVultr Customer RouteMAINT-AS204732024-08-06Announced
2a14:7581:4821::/48RIPE—RASKA-MNT2024-08-06Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS215223 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS215223:AS-SETPeeringDBDeclared by the operator as its own set
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS215223 as a direct member
AS-IFOGALTDBLists AS215223 as a direct member
AS-IFOGRIPELists AS215223 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V6RIPELists AS215223 as a direct member
AS-TSCHAJERARIPELists AS215223 as a direct member
AS20473:AS-VULTRRADBLists AS215223 as a direct member
AS215223:AS-SETRIPELists AS215223 as a direct member
AS41051:AS-PARTICIPANTSRIPELists AS215223 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-11-05 13:06 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-11-05. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.