asn.dev

Routing security

AS213702 QWINS-LTD QWINS AS-SET: ~ # AS213702:AS-CUSTOMERS

Unclassified Spamhaus ASN-DROP RIPE

RPKI valid 57% 4 of 7 announcements
RPKI invalid 3 dropped by validating networks
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 0% 3 missing · 4 other origin
ROAs 17 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

7 observed

Every prefix observed with AS213702 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
95.164.53.0/24RPKI invalidNo IRR1
95.164.55.0/24RPKI invalidNo IRR1
95.164.123.0/24RPKI invalidNo IRR1
93.123.39.0/24RPKI validIRR other origin54
141.98.6.0/24RPKI validIRR other origin54
178.17.59.0/24RPKI validIRR other origin1
195.66.27.0/24RPKI validIRR other origin1

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

17 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS213702 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
80.253.249.0/24/24RIPENCC
84.21.189.0/24/24RIPENCC
93.123.39.0/24/24RIPENCC
95.164.12.0/24/24RIPENCC
95.164.250.0/24/24RIPENCC
141.98.6.0/24/24RIPENCC
178.17.59.0/24/24RIPENCC
195.66.27.0/24/24RIPENCC
2a01:ecc0:80::/42/48RIPENCC
2a12:bec4:150::/44/44RIPENCC
2a12:bec4:1460::/44/44RIPENCC
2a12:bec4:1a70::/44/44RIPENCC
2a12:bec4:1a80::/44/44RIPENCC
2a12:bec4:1c70::/44/44RIPENCC
2a12:bec4:1c80::/44/44RIPENCC
2a12:bec4:1c90::/44/48RIPENCC
2a12:bec4:2000::/44/44RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

0 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS213702 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

No route objects name this AS as origin.

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS213702 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-CREANOVARIPELists AS213702 as a direct member
AS-HOSTKEYBVRIPELists AS213702 as a direct member
AS-PHPFRIENDSRIPELists AS213702 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V4RIPELists AS213702 as a direct member
AS-TRANSROUTE-SPECRIPELists AS213702 as a direct member
AS-TUBERIPELists AS213702 as a direct member
AS-ZETNETRIPELists AS213702 as a direct member
AS19318:AS-ALLRADBLists AS213702 as a direct member
AS201814:AS-CLIENTSRIPELists AS213702 as a direct member
AS209693:AS-CENTHOSTRIPELists AS213702 as a direct member
AS212112:AS-WORLDWIDEHOSTINGRIPELists AS213702 as a direct member
AS213702:AS-CUSTOMERSRIPELists AS213702 as a direct member
AS214417:AS-CENTHOSTRIPELists AS213702 as a direct member
AS215730:AS-NEXUSRIPELists AS213702 as a direct member
AS23470:AS-ALLRADBLists AS213702 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-31 12:02 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-31. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.