Autonomous system
AS213680 MOFA-QA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Qatar)
government qatar mofa
MOFA- is operated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Qatar.
What it's used for
- The address space carries government network operations, as indicated by the netnames
QA-MOFA-20020530andQA-MOFA-20260505and the registrant "Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Network Operations". - The AS announces 1280 IPv4 addresses across 2 prefixes and 2 IPv6 prefixes, with only 2 observed neighbours, indicating a small, self-contained government network rather than a transit or access provider.
- Traffic from this AS consists of diplomatic and administrative communications for the Qatari government's foreign affairs ministry.
Notable
- Registrants for both announced prefixes match the AS holder, identifying the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the consistent owner of the address space.
- The inventory consists of one /22 and one /24 in IPv4, along with two /47 blocks in IPv6, representing a modest allocation typical of a single government department.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| Qatar Internet Exchange Point | Doha, Qatar | 185.1.159.74 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-11-03, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 2 prefixes · 1.28K addresses IPv6 2 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| QA | Qatar | 4 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS213680- Registry name
- MOFA-QA
- Registrant
- MOFA-QA-MNT
- Abuse contact
- NetOps@mofa.gov.qa
- Registered
- 2024-12-19
- Last changed
- 2026-08-01
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 11 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 15 authorising AS213680
- ASPA
- 2 declared providers
- IRR
- 100% registered · 11 of 11 announcements
- Route objects
- 15 naming AS213680
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 451 networks and 1,853 prefixes, as published 2026-11-04. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere