Routing security
AS212316 MELMASTI-GLOBAL
Unclassified RIPE
Announcements
What this network originates
Every prefix observed with AS212316 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.
| Prefix | RPKI | IRR | Vantage points |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2a05:dc80::/29 | RPKI valid | IRR | 32 |
| 2a05:dc80::/48 | RPKI valid | IRR covering | 32 |
| 2a05:dc86::/48 | RPKI valid | IRR covering | 32 |
| 2a05:dc86:1::/48 | RPKI valid | IRR covering | 32 |
| 2a05:dc86:10::/48 | RPKI valid | IRR covering | 32 |
| 2a05:dc86:11::/48 | RPKI valid | IRR covering | 32 |
| 107.6.126.0/23 | RPKI valid | IRR | 56 |
| 107.6.126.0/24 | RPKI valid | IRR covering | 56 |
| 107.6.127.0/24 | RPKI valid | IRR covering | 56 |
RPKI · ROAs
Route origin authorisations
Signed statements by address holders that AS212316 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.
| Prefix | Max length | Trust anchor |
|---|---|---|
| 107.6.126.0/23 | /24 | RIPENCC |
| 107.6.126.0/24 | /24 | RIPENCC |
| 107.6.127.0/24 | /24 | RIPENCC |
| 2a05:dc80::/29 | /48 | RIPENCC |
| 2a05:dc80::/48 | /48 | RIPENCC |
| 2a05:dc81::/48 | /48 | RIPENCC |
| 2a0c:9a40:8690::/48 | /48 | RIPENCC |
ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.
RPKI · ASPA
Declared transit providers
This network has signed an ASPA record naming its transit providers. Each is compared against the upstreams observed in routing paths.
| AS | Network | ASPA | Routing paths |
|---|---|---|---|
| AS20473 | The Constant Company, LLC | Declared | not observed |
| AS24940 | Hetzner Online GmbH | Declared | Observed |
An observed upstream that is not declared is not necessarily a leak: our upstream inference cannot tell a transit provider from a peer seen in the same position. A declared provider that is never observed is usually a backup path.
IRR
Registered route objects
Route objects naming AS212316 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.
| Prefix | Source | Description | Maintainer | Changed | Routing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2a0c:9a40:8690::/48 | RADB | Vultr Customer Route | MAINT-AS20473 | 2025-09-25 | Not announced |
| 107.6.126.0/23 | RADB | Vultr Customer Route | MAINT-AS20473 | 2026-01-19 | Announced |
| 2a05:dc80::/29 | RADB | Vultr Customer Route | MAINT-AS20473 | 2025-09-24 | Announced |
IRR
AS-sets
The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS212316 directly show who expects to carry it.
| AS-set | Where | Relationship |
|---|---|---|
AS-HETZNER | RIPE | Lists AS212316 as a direct member |
AS20473:AS-VULTR | RADB | Lists AS212316 as a direct member |
AS212635:AS-BGP-EXCHANGE-AMSTERDAM-RS | RIPE | Lists AS212316 as a direct member |
RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-12 12:10 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-12. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.