asn.dev

Routing security

AS211009 KAA-AS Kazyanin Andrei Anatolevich

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 7 of 7 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 7 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

7 observed

Every prefix observed with AS211009 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a11:ab84::/32RPKI validIRR32
2a11:bdc4::/32RPKI validIRR32
2a12:2806::/32RPKI validIRR32
2a12:6480::/32RPKI validIRR32
2a12:6486::/32RPKI validIRR32
2a12:bc82::/32RPKI validIRR32
2a12:f981::/32RPKI validIRR32

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

7 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS211009 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
2a11:ab84::/32/32RIPENCC
2a11:bdc4::/32/32RIPENCC
2a12:2806::/32/32RIPENCC
2a12:6480::/32/32RIPENCC
2a12:6486::/32/32RIPENCC
2a12:bc82::/32/32RIPENCC
2a12:f981::/32/32RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

7 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS211009 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
2a11:ab84::/32RIPE—IP-RIPE2026-09-16Announced
2a11:bdc4::/32RIPE—IP-RIPE2026-09-16Announced
2a12:2806::/32RIPE—IP-RIPE2026-07-06Announced
2a12:6480::/32RIPE—IP-RIPE2026-07-06Announced
2a12:6486::/32RIPE—IP-RIPE2026-07-02Announced
2a12:bc82::/32RIPE—IP-RIPE2026-07-06Announced
2a12:f981::/32RIPE—IP-RIPE2026-09-16Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS211009 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS211009 as a direct member
AS-KONTELRIPELists AS211009 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-11-10 13:04 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-11-10. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.