Autonomous system
AS210245 KNG-AS
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
Kuwait National Guard
government military security
KNG-AS is operated by the Kuwait National Guard.
What it's used for
- The address space carries internal military and security infrastructure, evidenced by the netname
Camp3and the registrantKuwait National Guard. - The AS announces 768 IPv4 addresses across 2 prefixes with only 1 observed neighbour, indicating a self-contained internal network rather than a transit or access provider.
- Traffic consists of internal communications and command-and-control systems for the paramilitary and gendarmerie branch of the Kuwait Armed Forces.
Notable
- Registrants align with the announcer, listing
Kuwait National GuardandAbuse-C Rolefor the respective prefixes. - The inventory is small and finely subdivided into two specific blocks, consistent with a dedicated corporate or institutional estate.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Transit providers
1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
| AS | Network | Paths seen |
|---|---|---|
| AS42961 | Mobile Telecommunications Company K.S.C.P. | 177 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-26, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 2 prefixes · 768 addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| KW | Kuwait | 2 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS210245- Registry name
- KNG-AS
- Registrant
- kw-kng-1-mnt
- Abuse contact
- netop@kng.gov.kw
- Registered
- 2018-09-10
- Last changed
- 2018-09-10
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 3 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS210245
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 3 of 3 announcements
- Route objects
- 10 naming AS210245
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 445 networks and 1,817 prefixes, as published 2026-10-27. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere