asn.dev

Routing security

AS209377 FOURCONSULT 4Consult B.V.

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 13 of 13 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 13 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

13 observed

Every prefix observed with AS209377 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a09:2c40::/29RPKI validIRR30
2a09:2c40:10::/48RPKI validIRR covering30
2a09:2c40:11::/48RPKI validIRR covering30
2a09:2c40:12::/48RPKI validIRR covering30
2a09:2c40:13::/48RPKI validIRR covering30
2a09:2c40:a::/48RPKI validIRR covering30
2a09:2c40:b::/48RPKI validIRR covering30
2a09:2c40:c::/48RPKI validIRR covering30
2a09:2c40:d::/48RPKI validIRR covering30
2a09:2c40:e::/48RPKI validIRR covering30
2a09:2c40:f::/48RPKI validIRR covering30
152.89.4.0/22RPKI validIRR54
152.89.4.0/24RPKI validIRR covering54

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

13 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS209377 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
152.89.4.0/22/22RIPENCC
152.89.4.0/24/24RIPENCC
2a09:2c40::/29/29RIPENCC
2a09:2c40:a::/48/48RIPENCC
2a09:2c40:b::/48/48RIPENCC
2a09:2c40:c::/48/48RIPENCC
2a09:2c40:d::/48/48RIPENCC
2a09:2c40:e::/48/48RIPENCC
2a09:2c40:f::/48/48RIPENCC
2a09:2c40:10::/48/48RIPENCC
2a09:2c40:11::/48/48RIPENCC
2a09:2c40:12::/48/48RIPENCC
2a09:2c40:13::/48/48RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

2 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS209377 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
152.89.4.0/22RIPE4Consult B.V. - NetworkMNT-4CONSULT2019-05-20Announced
2a09:2c40::/29RIPE4Consult B.V. - NetworkMNT-4CONSULT2022-06-24Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS209377 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-CAVEORIPELists AS209377 as a direct member
AS-JOINTTRANSITRIPELists AS209377 as a direct member
AS-JOINTTRANSIT-IPV6RIPELists AS209377 as a direct member
AS-NL-IX-RSRIPELists AS209377 as a direct member
AS-OPENPEERINGRIPELists AS209377 as a direct member
AS41960:AS-NEXTPERTISERIPELists AS209377 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-11-15 12:58 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-11-15. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.