asn.dev

Routing security

AS209046 AS-GAL

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 10 of 10 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 10 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

10 observed

Every prefix observed with AS209046 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
45.9.44.0/22RPKI validIRR51
45.9.44.0/24RPKI validIRR52
45.9.45.0/24RPKI validIRR51
45.9.46.0/24RPKI validIRR51
45.9.47.0/24RPKI validIRR51
89.232.4.0/22RPKI validIRR51
89.232.4.0/24RPKI validIRR covering51
89.232.5.0/24RPKI validIRR covering51
89.232.6.0/24RPKI validIRR covering51
89.232.7.0/24RPKI validIRR covering51

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

10 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS209046 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
45.9.44.0/22/22RIPENCC
45.9.44.0/24/24RIPENCC
45.9.45.0/24/24RIPENCC
45.9.46.0/24/24RIPENCC
45.9.47.0/24/24RIPENCC
89.232.4.0/22/22RIPENCC
89.232.4.0/24/24RIPENCC
89.232.5.0/24/24RIPENCC
89.232.6.0/24/24RIPENCC
89.232.7.0/24/24RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

3 declared

This network has signed an ASPA record naming its transit providers. Each is compared against the upstreams observed in routing paths.

ASNetworkASPARouting paths
AS20771Caucasus Online Ltd.DeclaredObserved
AS35805JSC "Silknet"DeclaredObserved
AS198150SIACOM JSCDeclaredObserved

An observed upstream that is not declared is not necessarily a leak: our upstream inference cannot tell a transit provider from a peer seen in the same position. A declared provider that is never observed is usually a backup path.

IRR

Registered route objects

6 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS209046 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
45.9.44.0/22RIPE—MNT-GE-GEORGIANAIRLINK-12019-08-05Announced
45.9.44.0/24RIPE—MNT-GE-GEORGIANAIRLINK-12019-08-19Announced
45.9.45.0/24RIPE—MNT-GE-GEORGIANAIRLINK-12019-08-19Announced
45.9.46.0/24RIPE—MNT-GE-GEORGIANAIRLINK-12019-08-19Announced
45.9.47.0/24RIPE—MNT-GE-GEORGIANAIRLINK-12019-08-19Announced
89.232.4.0/22RIPEGeorgian AirlinkCAUCASUS-NET-MNT2025-04-09Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS209046 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-CORIPELists AS209046 as a direct member
AS-IXP-GERIPELists AS209046 as a direct member
AS-RASCOMRIPELists AS209046 as a direct member
AS-SET-GALRIPELists AS209046 as a direct member
AS-SET-SILKNET-LOCALRIPELists AS209046 as a direct member
AS-SET-UTGRIPELists AS209046 as a direct member
AS-SKYTELRIPELists AS209046 as a direct member
AS198150:AS-AIRLINKRIPELists AS209046 as a direct member
AS198150:AS-SIACOMRIPELists AS209046 as a direct member
AS198150:AS-SIACOM-CRIPELists AS209046 as a direct member
AS20764:AS-RASCOMRIPELists AS209046 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-15 12:09 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-15. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.