asn.dev

Routing security

AS207907 ELIA-AS

Unclassified RIPE Educational/Research

RPKI valid 100% 7 of 7 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 2 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

7 observed

Every prefix observed with AS207907 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a0e:8f02:206a::/48RPKI validIRR34
2a0e:8f02:206b::/48RPKI validIRR34
2a0e:8f02:2060::/48RPKI validIRR34
2a0e:8f02:2061::/48RPKI validIRR34
2a0e:8f02:2062::/48RPKI validIRR34
2a0e:8f02:2069::/48RPKI validIRR34
2a0f:b240:900::/48RPKI validIRR34

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

2 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS207907 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
2a0e:8f02:2060::/44/48RIPENCC
2a0f:b240:900::/40/48RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

5 declared

This network has signed an ASPA record naming its transit providers. Each is compared against the upstreams observed in routing paths.

ASNetworkASPARouting paths
AS6939Hurricane Electric LLCDeclaredObserved
AS34927iFog GmbHDeclaredObserved
AS41051Openfactory GmbHDeclaredObserved
AS207841Inferno Communications LtdDeclaredObserved
AS209735Lagrange Cloud Technologies LimitedDeclaredObserved
AS13030Init7 (Switzerland) Ltd.not declaredObserved
AS205794JINZE YANGnot declaredObserved
AS1103SURF B.V.not declaredObserved
AS24482SG.GSnot declaredObserved

An observed upstream that is not declared is not necessarily a leak: our upstream inference cannot tell a transit provider from a peer seen in the same position. A declared provider that is never observed is usually a backup path.

IRR

Registered route objects

9 objects · 2 not announced

Route objects naming AS207907 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
45.152.160.0/22RADBUOMAINT-AS3999892026-01-07Not announced
192.95.84.0/22RADBUOMAINT-AS3999892026-01-07Not announced
2a0e:8f02:2060::/48RIPE—ELIA-MNT2025-07-08Announced
2a0e:8f02:2061::/48RIPE—ELIA-MNT2025-10-05Announced
2a0e:8f02:2062::/48RIPE—ELIA-MNT2025-12-04Announced
2a0e:8f02:2069::/48RIPE—ELIA-MNT2025-07-03Announced
2a0e:8f02:206a::/48RIPE—ELIA-MNT2025-07-03Announced
2a0e:8f02:206b::/48RIPE—ELIA-MNT2025-08-04Announced
2a0f:b240:900::/48RIPE—ELIA-MNT2025-12-23Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS207907 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS207907:AS-ELIAPeeringDBDeclared by the operator as its own set
AS-40676RADBLists AS207907 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS207907 as a direct member
AS-IFOGALTDBLists AS207907 as a direct member
AS-IFOGRIPELists AS207907 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V6RIPELists AS207907 as a direct member
AS207907:AS-ELIARIPELists AS207907 as a direct member
AS399989:AS-ALLRADBLists AS207907 as a direct member
AS41051:AS-PARTICIPANTSRIPELists AS207907 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-23 12:03 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-23. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.