asn.dev

Routing security

AS20777 Techspace

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 1 of 1 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 1 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

1 observed

Every prefix observed with AS20777 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
194.125.241.0/24RPKI validIRR51

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

1 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS20777 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
194.125.241.0/24/24RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

1 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS20777 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
194.125.241.0/24RIPEINFOSERV-RIGAISR-MNT2021-10-05Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS20777 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-LATTELEKOMRIPELists AS20777 as a direct member
AS-LATVIARIPELists AS20777 as a direct member
AS-LIXLVRIPELists AS20777 as a direct member
AS-NIC-LVRIPELists AS20777 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-17 12:17 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, collected 2026-10-17. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.