asn.dev

Routing security

AS20724 GLOBALTELEHOST

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 13 of 13 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 92% 1 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 17 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

13 observed

Every prefix observed with AS20724 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
178.211.159.0/24RPKI validNo IRR51
80.244.12.0/24RPKI validIRR51
80.244.13.0/24RPKI validIRR51
91.227.62.0/24RPKI validIRR51
91.239.216.0/24RPKI validIRR51
93.95.24.0/24RPKI validIRR51
160.19.94.0/24RPKI validIRR51
185.130.89.0/24RPKI validIRR51
185.244.104.0/24RPKI validIRR51
193.104.245.0/24RPKI validIRR51
193.109.253.0/24RPKI validIRR51
195.182.25.0/24RPKI validIRR51
212.46.37.0/24RPKI validIRR51

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

17 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS20724 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
80.244.12.0/24/24RIPENCC
80.244.13.0/24/24RIPENCC
91.208.108.0/24/24RIPENCC
91.227.62.0/24/24RIPENCC
91.239.216.0/24/24RIPENCC
93.95.24.0/24/24RIPENCC
146.19.21.0/24/24RIPENCC
160.19.94.0/24/24RIPENCC
178.211.159.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.130.89.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.244.104.0/24/24RIPENCC
193.9.16.0/24/24RIPENCC
193.104.245.0/24/24RIPENCC
193.109.253.0/24/24RIPENCC
194.26.215.0/24/24RIPENCC
195.182.25.0/24/24RIPENCC
212.46.37.0/24/24RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

16 objects · 4 not announced

Route objects naming AS20724 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
91.208.108.0/24RIPE—XANTHO-MNT2026-09-08Not announced
146.19.21.0/24RIPE—XANTHO-MNT2026-09-08Not announced
193.9.16.0/24RIPE—LIR-LT-UABREVONIA16-1-MNT2026-09-08Not announced
194.26.215.0/24RIPE—XANTHO-MNT2026-09-08Not announced
80.244.12.0/24RIPE—XANTHO-MNT2026-09-04Announced
80.244.13.0/24RIPE—XANTHO-MNT2025-12-08Announced
91.227.62.0/24RIPE—XANTHO-MNT2025-12-05Announced
91.239.216.0/24RIPE—LIR-LT-UABREVONIA16-1-MNT2025-12-12Announced
93.95.24.0/24RIPE—LIR-LT-MBEISINA-1-MNT2025-12-08Announced
160.19.94.0/24RIPE—XANTHO-MNT2026-09-04Announced
185.130.89.0/24RIPE—LIR-LT-UABREVONIA16-1-MNT2026-04-07Announced
185.244.104.0/24RIPE—XANTHO-MNT2026-04-07Announced
193.104.245.0/24RIPE—LIR-LT-MBEISINA-1-MNT2025-12-03Announced
193.109.253.0/24RIPE—LIR-LT-UABREVONIA16-1-MNT2025-12-12Announced
195.182.25.0/24RIPE—XANTHO-MNT2026-04-10Announced
212.46.37.0/24RIPE—XANTHO-MNT2025-12-08Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS20724 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-GTHOSTARINLists AS20724 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-16 12:09 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-16. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.