asn.dev

Routing security

AS207029 WIME-AS

Residential RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 15 of 15 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 15 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

15 observed

Every prefix observed with AS207029 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a05:a580::/29RPKI validIRR30
2a06:ea00::/29RPKI validIRR30
185.85.20.0/24RPKI validIRR52
185.85.24.0/22RPKI validIRR52
185.85.24.0/23RPKI validIRR52
185.85.26.0/23RPKI validIRR52
185.134.8.0/22RPKI validIRR52
185.134.8.0/23RPKI validIRR52
185.134.10.0/23RPKI validIRR52
185.210.112.0/22RPKI validIRR52
185.210.112.0/23RPKI validIRR52
185.210.114.0/23RPKI validIRR52
213.226.104.0/22RPKI validIRR52
213.226.104.0/23RPKI validIRR52
213.226.106.0/23RPKI validIRR52

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

15 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS207029 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
185.85.20.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.85.24.0/22/22RIPENCC
185.85.24.0/23/23RIPENCC
185.85.26.0/23/23RIPENCC
185.134.8.0/22/22RIPENCC
185.134.8.0/23/23RIPENCC
185.134.10.0/23/23RIPENCC
185.210.112.0/22/22RIPENCC
185.210.112.0/23/23RIPENCC
185.210.114.0/23/23RIPENCC
213.226.104.0/22/22RIPENCC
213.226.104.0/23/23RIPENCC
213.226.106.0/23/23RIPENCC
2a05:a580::/29/29RIPENCC
2a06:ea00::/29/29RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

15 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS207029 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
185.85.20.0/24RIPE—DATACAST2023-05-03Announced
185.85.24.0/22RIPE—DATACAST2016-12-02Announced
185.85.24.0/23RIPE—EPLANET-MNT2023-12-12Announced
185.85.26.0/23RIPE—EPLANET-MNT2023-12-12Announced
185.134.8.0/22RIPE—DATACAST2017-11-22Announced
185.134.8.0/23RIPE—EPLANET-MNT2016-11-23Announced
185.134.10.0/23RIPE—EPLANET-MNT2016-11-23Announced
185.210.112.0/22RIPE—DATACAST2023-10-02Announced
185.210.112.0/23RIPE—WIME-MNT2023-10-02Announced
185.210.114.0/23RIPE—WIME-MNT2023-10-02Announced
213.226.104.0/22RIPE—WIME-MNT2018-12-07Announced
213.226.104.0/23RIPE—WIME-MNT2023-10-02Announced
213.226.106.0/23RIPE—WIME-MNT2023-10-02Announced
2a05:a580::/29RIPE—WIME-MNT2024-03-01Announced
2a06:ea00::/29RIPE—WIME-MNT2024-03-01Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS207029 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-RETELITRIPELists AS207029 as a direct member
AS208877:AS-PEERSRIPELists AS207029 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-15 12:09 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-15. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.