asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS206977 azstatenet STATE SERVICE OF SPECIAL COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION SECURITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN

Unclassified RIPE

IPv4 addresses 7.42K 14 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly AZ
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 3 2 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

AzStateNet

Azerbaijan · AI-generated

government state network azerbaijan

The AS handle AZSTATENET is held by the State Service of Special Communication and Information Security of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

What it's used for

  • The address space carries government and state authority traffic, as indicated by the netname AZ-STATENET-20100331 and the registrant identity of the State Service.
  • The AS announces 7424 IPv4 addresses across 14 prefixes with 4 observed neighbours, a ratio consistent with an internal state network rather than a transit or large-scale access provider.
  • Traffic from this AS consists of communications for central and local state authorities of the Republic of Azerbaijan, operating as a dedicated segment of the internet for government entities.

Notable

  • Registrants for the majority of prefixes are listed as DeltaTelecom or Megalink LLC, which differ from the primary announcer, suggesting leased space or historical allocation patterns within the state network.
  • The address inventory is fragmented into multiple /24 and /21 blocks, including specific allocations for DeltaTelecom and Megalink LLC, reflecting a subdivided internal estate.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

3 upstream, 2 downstream and 5 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS29049Delta Telecom Ltd1,413
AS196925Azertelecom LLC112
AS198949Radware Ltd60

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-11-02, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 14 prefixes · 7.42K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
AZAzerbaijan14

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS206977
Registry name
azstatenet
Registrant
lir-az-statenet-1-MNT
Abuse contact
abuse@gov.az
Registered
2022-12-28
Last changed
2026-04-01
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
73% valid · 19 valid, 7 with no ROA
ROAs
33 authorising AS206977
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 26 of 26 announcements
Route objects
44 naming AS206977

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 448 networks and 1,851 prefixes, as published 2026-11-03. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check