asn.dev

Routing security

AS20694 NMMN-AS

Hosting RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 9 of 9 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 12 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

9 observed

Every prefix observed with AS20694 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a01:688::/32RPKI validIRR30
2a01:689::/32RPKI validIRR29
2a02:22f0:12::/48RPKI validIRR30
46.30.24.0/22RPKI validIRR54
185.45.110.0/23RPKI validIRR54
185.166.200.0/24RPKI validIRR54
185.166.202.0/24RPKI validIRR51
188.94.24.0/21RPKI validIRR54
217.114.64.0/20RPKI validIRR54

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

12 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS20694 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
46.30.24.0/22/22RIPENCC
185.45.110.0/23/23RIPENCC
185.166.200.0/22/24RIPENCC
185.166.200.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.166.201.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.166.202.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.166.203.0/24/24RIPENCC
188.94.24.0/21/21RIPENCC
217.114.64.0/20/20RIPENCC
2a01:688::/32/32RIPENCC
2a01:689::/32/32RIPENCC
2a02:22f0:12::/48/48RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

16 objects · 7 not announced

Route objects naming AS20694 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
185.166.200.0/22RIPE—NMMN-MNT2016-11-11Not announced
185.166.201.0/24RIPE—NMMN-MNT2025-01-08Not announced
185.166.203.0/24RIPE—NMMN-MNT2025-01-08Not announced
212.108.184.0/21RIPEMetro Cloud, Hamburg, GermanyLYNET-MNT2025-06-16Not announced
217.114.64.0/21RIPENMMN - Customer NetworksNMMN-MNT2009-01-02Not announced
217.114.72.0/21RIPENMMN - RZ HamburgNMMN-MNT2009-01-02Not announced
2a02:358:1000::/36RIPEMetro Cloud, Hamburg, GermanyLYNET-MNT2025-06-16Not announced
46.30.24.0/22RIPEportrix Systems GmbHPORTRIX-MNT2025-06-20Announced
185.45.110.0/23RIPEportrix Systems GmbHPORTRIX-MNT2022-06-22Announced
185.166.200.0/24RIPE—NMMN-MNT2025-01-08Announced
185.166.202.0/24RIPE—NMMN-MNT2025-01-08Announced
188.94.24.0/21RIPENMMN - New Media Markets & NetworksNMMN-MNT2009-05-28Announced
217.114.64.0/20RIPENMMN - New Media Markets & NetworksNMMN-MNT2009-01-02Announced
2a01:688::/32RIPENMMN - New Media Markets & Networks GmbHNMMN-MNT2010-08-06Announced
2a01:689::/32RIPENMMN - New Media Markets & Networks GmbHNMMN-MNT2025-06-12Announced
2a02:22f0:12::/48RIPEportrix Systems GmbHPORTRIX-MNT2022-06-22Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS20694 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-ECIX-HAMRIPELists AS20694 as a direct member
AS-GCNETDEV6RIPELists AS20694 as a direct member
AS-GTTCUSTRIPELists AS20694 as a direct member
AS-GTTCUST6RIPELists AS20694 as a direct member
AS-KPNRIPELists AS20694 as a direct member
AS-NMMNRIPELists AS20694 as a direct member
AS-PLUSSERVERRIPELists AS20694 as a direct member
AS-TRANSROUTE-SPECRIPELists AS20694 as a direct member
AS31027:AS-GCNET-LEGACYRIPELists AS20694 as a direct member
AS31027:AS-GCNETDERIPELists AS20694 as a direct member
AS31027:AS-NIANETRIPELists AS20694 as a direct member
AS43252:AS-DECIX-HAM-CONNECTEDRIPELists AS20694 as a direct member
AS43252:AS-DECIX-HAM-RSRIPELists AS20694 as a direct member
AS43252:AS-DECIX-HAM-RS-V6RIPELists AS20694 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-13 12:16 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-13. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.