asn.dev

Routing security

AS206866 GARTEL

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 91% 10 of 11 announcements
RPKI invalid 1 dropped by validating networks
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 91% 0 missing · 1 other origin
ROAs 17 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

11 observed

Every prefix observed with AS206866 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a12:9740::/29RPKI invalidIRR other origin3
2a02:52e0::/32RPKI validIRR34
84.232.40.0/21RPKI validIRR51
157.97.88.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
157.97.93.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
157.97.94.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
157.97.95.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
176.98.216.0/23RPKI validIRR covering52
185.56.180.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
185.56.181.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
185.56.182.0/23RPKI validIRR51

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

17 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS206866 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
84.232.40.0/21/21RIPENCC
84.232.122.0/23/23RIPENCC
94.24.44.0/23/23RIPENCC
157.97.88.0/24/24RIPENCC
157.97.89.0/24/24RIPENCC
157.97.90.0/24/24RIPENCC
157.97.91.0/24/24RIPENCC
157.97.92.0/24/24RIPENCC
157.97.93.0/24/24RIPENCC
157.97.94.0/24/24RIPENCC
157.97.95.0/24/24RIPENCC
176.98.216.0/23/23RIPENCC
176.98.218.0/23/23RIPENCC
185.56.180.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.56.181.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.56.182.0/23/24RIPENCC
2a02:52e0::/32/32RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

13 objects · 10 not announced

Route objects naming AS206866 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
84.232.122.0/23RIPEServiHosting Networks S.L.SERVIHOSTING-MNT2024-08-05Not announced
94.24.44.0/23RIPEServiHosting Networks S.L.SERVIHOSTING-MNT2024-08-05Not announced
149.100.0.0/24RADBRoute Registered for Cogent Communications Customer - Gartel Telefonia Y Comunicacion SLMAINT-AS1742023-11-13Not announced
149.100.1.0/24RADBRoute Registered for Cogent Communications Customer - Gartel Telefonia Y Comunicacion SLMAINT-AS1742023-11-13Not announced
154.48.177.0/24RADBRoute Registered for Cogent Communications Customer Gartel Telefonia Y Comunicacion SLMAINT-AS1742023-11-13Not announced
154.61.116.0/24RADBRoute Registered for Cogent Communications Customer Gartel Telefonia Y Comunicacion SLMAINT-AS1742023-11-13Not announced
157.97.88.0/21RIPE—GT11520-RIPE2020-05-26Not announced
176.98.216.0/22RIPE—GT11520-RIPE2020-05-26Not announced
185.56.180.0/22RIPE—GT11520-RIPE2020-05-26Not announced
185.56.180.0/23RIPE—GT11520-RIPE2020-05-27Not announced
84.232.40.0/21RIPEServiHosting Networks S.L.SERVIHOSTING-MNT2024-08-05Announced
185.56.182.0/23RIPE—GT11520-RIPE2020-05-27Announced
2a02:52e0::/32RIPE—GT11520-MNT2024-06-07Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS206866 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-CODINETRIPELists AS206866 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS206866 as a direct member
AS-IXPLAYRIPELists AS206866 as a direct member
AS-MUNDIRIPELists AS206866 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V4RIPELists AS206866 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V6RIPELists AS206866 as a direct member
AS-SERVIHOSTINGRIPELists AS206866 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-16 12:09 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-16. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.