asn.dev

Routing security

AS204310 SYNERGIES

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 4 of 4 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 6 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

4 observed

Every prefix observed with AS204310 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a0c:3ec0::/32RPKI validIRR31
2a0c:3ec7::/32RPKI validIRR21
185.253.172.0/24RPKI validIRR covering54
185.253.175.0/24RPKI validIRR16

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

6 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS204310 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
185.253.172.0/22/22RIPENCC
185.253.172.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.253.175.0/24/24RIPENCC
2a0c:3ec0::/29/29RIPENCC
2a0c:3ec0::/32/32RIPENCC
2a0c:3ec7::/32/32RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

2 declared

This network has signed an ASPA record naming its transit providers. Each is compared against the upstreams observed in routing paths.

ASNetworkASPARouting paths
AS553Universitaet StuttgartDeclaredObserved
AS21473PFALZKOM GmbHDeclaredObserved
AS6939Hurricane Electric LLCnot declaredObserved
AS24482SG.GSnot declaredObserved
AS25091IP-Max SAnot declaredObserved
AS57821Nonattached Network e.V.not declaredObserved
AS202365Omer GOLGELInot declaredObserved
AS34800Securebit AGnot declaredObserved
AS212508Lowhosting services of Davide Gennarinot declaredObserved

An observed upstream that is not declared is not necessarily a leak: our upstream inference cannot tell a transit provider from a peer seen in the same position. A declared provider that is never observed is usually a backup path.

IRR

Registered route objects

5 objects · 2 not announced

Route objects naming AS204310 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
185.253.172.0/22RIPESYNERGIESBST-MNT2018-04-06Not announced
2a0c:3ec0::/29RIPESYNERGIESBST-MNT2018-04-06Not announced
185.253.175.0/24RIPESYNERGIESBST-MNT2020-08-28Announced
2a0c:3ec0::/32RIPESYNERGIESBST-MNT2025-10-04Announced
2a0c:3ec7::/32RIPESYNERGIESBST-MNT2020-08-28Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS204310 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-MANETRIPELists AS204310 as a direct member
AS-SBAG:AS-DE-FRARIPELists AS204310 as a direct member
AS-SYNERGIESRIPELists AS204310 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-19 12:02 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-19. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.