Routing security
AS203852 KAZE_NET
Unclassified RIPE
Announcements
What this network originates
Every prefix observed with AS203852 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.
| Prefix | RPKI | IRR | Vantage points |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2a06:a005:21a0::/44 | RPKI valid | IRR | 35 |
| 2a06:a005:1910::/44 | RPKI valid | IRR | 35 |
RPKI · ROAs
Route origin authorisations
Signed statements by address holders that AS203852 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.
| Prefix | Max length | Trust anchor |
|---|---|---|
| 2a06:a005:1910::/44 | /48 | RIPENCC |
| 2a06:a005:21a0::/44 | /48 | RIPENCC |
ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.
RPKI · ASPA
Declared transit providers
This network has signed an ASPA record naming its transit providers. Each is compared against the upstreams observed in routing paths.
An observed upstream that is not declared is not necessarily a leak: our upstream inference cannot tell a transit provider from a peer seen in the same position. A declared provider that is never observed is usually a backup path.
IRR
Registered route objects
Route objects naming AS203852 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.
| Prefix | Source | Description | Maintainer | Changed | Routing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2a06:a005:1912::/48 | RIPE | If the solution is to disable IPv6 It is still broken | KZ64C9-MNT | 2024-05-16 | Not announced |
| 2a06:a005:1913::/48 | RIPE | Keep calm and reject RPKI invalids | KZ64C9-MNT | 2024-05-16 | Not announced |
| 2a06:a005:191c::/48 | RIPE | — | KZ64C9-MNT | 2023-12-12 | Not announced |
| 2a06:a005:191d::/48 | RIPE | — | KZ64C9-MNT | 2023-12-20 | Not announced |
| 2a06:a005:21ac::/48 | RIPE | — | KZ64C9-MNT | 2024-03-23 | Not announced |
| 2a06:a005:1910::/44 | RIPE | — | KZ64C9-MNT | 2023-12-12 | Announced |
| 2a06:a005:21a0::/44 | RIPE | — | KZ64C9-MNT | 2023-12-12 | Announced |
IRR
AS-sets
The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS203852 directly show who expects to carry it.
| AS-set | Where | Relationship |
|---|---|---|
AS-HURRICANEV6 | RADB | Lists AS203852 as a direct member |
AS-IQNET | RIPE | Lists AS203852 as a direct member |
AS-KZN | RIPE | Lists AS203852 as a direct member |
AS-QNET | RIPE | Lists AS203852 as a direct member |
AS-SETGBI | RIPE | Lists AS203852 as a direct member |
AS-SETGBI-2 | RIPE | Lists AS203852 as a direct member |
AS-SETGBI2 | RIPE | Lists AS203852 as a direct member |
AS209533:AS-BGPTUNNEL | RIPE | Lists AS203852 as a direct member |
AS41051:AS-PARTICIPANTS | RIPE | Lists AS203852 as a direct member |
AS53667:AS-CUSTOMERS | RADB | Lists AS203852 as a direct member |
RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-13 12:16 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-13. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.