asn.dev

Routing security

AS203545 NERZEN-BILISIM-TEKNOLOJILERI

Unclassified ARIN

RPKI valid 100% 9 of 9 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 9 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

9 observed

Every prefix observed with AS203545 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a0f:bf01::/48RPKI validIRR35
23.26.123.0/24RPKI validIRR52
31.77.55.0/24RPKI validIRR52
141.98.50.0/24RPKI validIRR52
144.225.64.0/24RPKI validIRR52
156.233.71.0/24RPKI validIRR52
166.1.5.0/24RPKI validIRR52
185.73.125.0/24RPKI validIRR52
194.146.26.0/24RPKI validIRR52

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

9 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS203545 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
23.26.123.0/24/24ARIN
31.77.55.0/24/24RIPENCC
141.98.50.0/24/24RIPENCC
144.225.64.0/24/24ARIN
156.233.71.0/24/24AFRINIC
166.1.5.0/24/24ARIN
185.73.125.0/24/24RIPENCC
194.146.26.0/24/24RIPENCC
2a0f:bf01::/48/48RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

10 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS203545 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
23.26.123.0/24ARINcustomer subnetMNT-ADC-962026-04-06Announced
31.77.55.0/24RIPE—INTERLIR-MNT2026-09-16Announced
141.98.50.0/24RIPE—MERIC-MNT2026-01-08Announced
144.225.64.0/24ARINcustomer subnetMNT-ADCIL2026-06-21Announced
156.233.71.0/24AFRINICTSArena INT. TEK. Ahmet Abdulhamit KAYALARUS-SERVICE-MNT2026-09-21Announced
156.233.71.0/24RADBTSArena_INT_TEK_Ahmet_Abdulhamit_KAYAMAINT-LARUS2026-09-22Announced
166.1.5.0/24ARINcustomer subnetMNT-ADC-962026-07-03Announced
185.73.125.0/24RIPE—INTERLIR-MNT2026-05-20Announced
194.146.26.0/24RIPE—MERIC-MNT2026-05-21Announced
2a0f:bf01::/48RIPE—LIR-TR-HOSTINGDUNYAM-1-MNT2026-07-06Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS203545 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-BIHNET-ALLRIPELists AS203545 as a direct member
AS-GIBIRNET-INTRIPELists AS203545 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS203545 as a direct member
AS-STORMWALL-SETRADBLists AS203545 as a direct member
AS-STORMWALL-SETRIPELists AS203545 as a direct member
AS199524:AS-GCORE-DPRIPELists AS203545 as a direct member
AS208972:AS-DDOS-PROTECTEDRIPELists AS203545 as a direct member
AS212219:AS-HOSTINGDUNYAMRIPELists AS203545 as a direct member
AS213796:AS-HOSTOPYARIPELists AS203545 as a direct member
AS218802:AS-PROTECTEDRIPELists AS203545 as a direct member
AS6205:AS-HIZLINETRIPELists AS203545 as a direct member
AS6205:AS-HIZLINET-SEC1RIPELists AS203545 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-13 12:16 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-13. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.