asn.dev

Routing security

AS202693 mosel Erik Schneider

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 9 of 9 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 9 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

9 observed

Every prefix observed with AS202693 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a06:c640::/32RPKI validIRR35
2a06:c641::/32RPKI validIRR35
2a06:c642::/32RPKI validIRR35
2a06:c643::/32RPKI validIRR35
2a06:c644::/32RPKI validIRR35
2a06:c645::/32RPKI validIRR35
2a06:c646::/32RPKI validIRR35
2a06:c647::/32RPKI validIRR35
80.75.220.0/24RPKI validIRR54

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

9 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS202693 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
80.75.220.0/24/24RIPENCC
2a06:c640::/32/32RIPENCC
2a06:c641::/32/32RIPENCC
2a06:c642::/32/32RIPENCC
2a06:c643::/32/32RIPENCC
2a06:c644::/32/32RIPENCC
2a06:c645::/32/32RIPENCC
2a06:c646::/32/32RIPENCC
2a06:c647::/32/32RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

10 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS202693 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
80.75.220.0/24RIPE—LIR-DE-MOSEL-1-MNT2024-01-09Announced
2a06:c640::/32RADBVultr Customer RouteMAINT-AS204732026-09-26Announced
2a06:c640::/32RIPE—LIR-DE-MOSEL-1-MNT2022-09-27Announced
2a06:c641::/32RIPE—LIR-DE-MOSEL-1-MNT2022-09-27Announced
2a06:c642::/32RIPE—LIR-DE-MOSEL-1-MNT2022-09-27Announced
2a06:c643::/32RIPE—LIR-DE-MOSEL-1-MNT2023-12-24Announced
2a06:c644::/32RIPE—LIR-DE-MOSEL-1-MNT2023-12-24Announced
2a06:c645::/32RIPE—LIR-DE-MOSEL-1-MNT2023-12-24Announced
2a06:c646::/32RIPE—LIR-DE-MOSEL-1-MNT2023-12-24Announced
2a06:c647::/32RIPE—LIR-DE-MOSEL-1-MNT2023-12-24Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS202693 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-FOGIXPRIPELists AS202693 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS202693 as a direct member
AS-HYEHOST:AS-WOLVERHAMPTONARINLists AS202693 as a direct member
AS-IFOGALTDBLists AS202693 as a direct member
AS-IFOGRIPELists AS202693 as a direct member
AS-MOSELRIPELists AS202693 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V4RIPELists AS202693 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V6RIPELists AS202693 as a direct member
AS-SBIX-RSRIPELists AS202693 as a direct member
AS202693:AS-MOSELRIPELists AS202693 as a direct member
AS20473:AS-VULTRRADBLists AS202693 as a direct member
AS35661:AS-FRA01DERIPELists AS202693 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-11-01 13:04 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-11-01. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.