Autonomous system
AS202585 BGP-RODEO bgp.rodeo fka. bouwhuis.network
Unclassified APNIC Educational/Research
Summary
BGP Rodeo
educational research personal netherlands
BGP-RODEO is operated by Nick Bouwhuis.
What it's used for
- The address space carries personal and research infrastructure, with reverse DNS entries pointing to
ip4.bgp.rodeoand netnamesBGP-RODEOandNICK-NET. - The AS announces 512 IPv4 addresses across 2 prefixes and 4 IPv6 prefixes, while maintaining 119 observed neighbours; this high neighbour-to-address ratio indicates a transit or peering-focused role rather than an access network.
- Traffic consists of BGP experimentation and educational research, as the operator runs BGP across multiple Internet Exchange Points in the Netherlands for learning and infrastructure engineering purposes.
Notable
- Registrants for both announced IPv4 prefixes are listed as Nick Bouwhuis, with netnames
BGP-RODEOandNICK-NET, aligning with the AS handleBGP-RODEO. - The AS handle includes the former name
bouwhuis.network, reflecting the operator's previous branding before adopting thebgp.rodeoidentity. - The inventory consists of two /24 IPv4 blocks and four IPv6 prefixes, all located in the Netherlands, representing a small, finely subdivided personal estate.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 6 exchanges in 2 countries, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| AMS-IX Amsterdam | Amsterdam, Netherlands | 80.249.212.222 |
| The Frys Internet Exchange | Frysian, Netherlands | 2001:7f8:10f::3:1759:195 |
| Speed Internet Exchange | Dronten, Netherlands | 185.1.222.252 |
| InterIX Internet Exchange | Amsterdam, Netherlands | 2001:7f8:134::80 |
| Nine IX | Paris, France | 185.1.14.129 |
| EuroGIX | Strasbourg, France | 185.1.14.129 |
Transit providers
21 upstream, 7 downstream and 45 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-27, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 2 prefixes · 512 addresses IPv6 5 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| NL | Netherlands | 7 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS202585- Registry name
- bgp-rodeo
- Registrant
- NICK-MNT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@bgp.rodeo
- Registered
- 2022-09-29
- Last changed
- 2026-10-11
- Allocation
- allocated
Declared
PeeringDB profile
- Name
- bgp.rodeo
- Also known as
- bouwhuis.network
- Network type
- Educational/Research
- Scope
- Europe
- Traffic ratio
- Balanced
- Peering policy
- Open
- IRR as-set
RIPE::AS202585:AS-RODEO- Present at
- 7 exchanges
- Facilities
- 2 facilities
- Website
- https://bgp.rodeo
PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 9 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 4 authorising AS202585
- ASPA
- 9 declared providers
- IRR
- 100% registered · 9 of 9 announcements
- Route objects
- 12 naming AS202585
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 447 networks and 1,852 prefixes, as published 2026-10-27. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere