asn.dev

Routing security

AS202340 SANOJ-KUMAR

Unclassified RIPE Educational/Research

RPKI valid 83% 5 of 6 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 1 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 7 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

6 observed

Every prefix observed with AS202340 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
44.30.22.0/24No ROAIRR51
2a10:cc40:210::/48RPKI validIRR31
2a10:cc40:211::/48RPKI validIRR31
2a10:cc40:213::/48RPKI validIRR4
2a10:cc40:214::/48RPKI validIRR31
2a10:cc40:216::/48RPKI validIRR32

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

7 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS202340 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
2a10:cc40:210::/44/48RIPENCC
2a10:cc40:211::/48/48RIPENCC
2a10:cc40:212::/48/48RIPENCC
2a10:cc40:213::/48/48RIPENCC
2a10:cc40:214::/48/48RIPENCC
2a10:cc40:215::/48/48RIPENCC
2a10:cc40:216::/48/48RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

11 objects · 4 not announced

Route objects naming AS202340 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
2a10:cc40:210::/44RADBVultr Customer RouteMAINT-AS204732023-11-13Not announced
2a10:cc40:210::/44RIPE—SANOJ-MNT2025-01-09Not announced
2a10:cc40:212::/48RIPE—SANOJ-MNT2022-10-28Not announced
2a10:cc40:215::/48RIPE—SANOJ-MNT2022-10-28Not announced
44.30.22.0/24RADBKJ5LPUMAINT-ARDC2025-06-11Announced
2a10:cc40:210::/48RIPE—SANOJ-MNT2025-01-08Announced
2a10:cc40:211::/48RIPE—SANOJ-MNT2022-10-28Announced
2a10:cc40:213::/48RIPE—SANOJ-MNT2022-10-28Announced
2a10:cc40:214::/48RIPE—SANOJ-MNT2022-10-28Announced
2a10:cc40:216::/48RADBAmazon EC2 PrefixMAINT-AS165092025-03-25Announced
2a10:cc40:216::/48RIPE—SANOJ-MNT2025-03-25Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS202340 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-SET-SANOJPeeringDBDeclared by the operator as its own set
AS-4IXPRIPELists AS202340 as a direct member
AS-4IXP-RSRIPELists AS202340 as a direct member
AS-4IXPV4RIPELists AS202340 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS202340 as a direct member
AS-IFOG-USRIPELists AS202340 as a direct member
AS-IR-ASNRIPELists AS202340 as a direct member
AS-RESPINARIPELists AS202340 as a direct member
AS-ROZINT-DOWNSTREAMARINLists AS202340 as a direct member
AS-SET-SANOJRIPELists AS202340 as a direct member
AS-TELSTRA-INTL-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS202340 as a direct member
AS16509:AS-AMAZON-BYO-AP-SOUTH-1ARINLists AS202340 as a direct member
AS20473:AS-VULTRRADBLists AS202340 as a direct member
AS209533:AS-BGPTUNNELRIPELists AS202340 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-11 12:23 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-11. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.