asn.dev

Routing security

AS202047 IPSECURITY

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 8 of 8 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 8 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

8 observed

Every prefix observed with AS202047 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
85.208.140.0/24RPKI validIRR52
85.208.141.0/24RPKI validIRR52
85.208.142.0/24RPKI validIRR52
85.208.143.0/24RPKI validIRR52
194.169.184.0/24RPKI validIRR52
194.169.185.0/24RPKI validIRR52
194.169.186.0/24RPKI validIRR52
194.169.187.0/24RPKI validIRR52

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

8 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS202047 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
85.208.140.0/24/24RIPENCC
85.208.141.0/24/24RIPENCC
85.208.142.0/24/24RIPENCC
85.208.143.0/24/24RIPENCC
194.169.184.0/24/24RIPENCC
194.169.185.0/24/24RIPENCC
194.169.186.0/24/24RIPENCC
194.169.187.0/24/24RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

9 objects · 1 not announced

Route objects naming AS202047 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
185.161.40.0/22RIPE—LIR-ES-BREAK1-1-MNT2025-01-27Not announced
85.208.140.0/24RIPE—MNT-ES-IPSECURITY-12019-03-14Announced
85.208.141.0/24RIPE—MNT-ES-IPSECURITY-12019-03-14Announced
85.208.142.0/24RIPE—MNT-ES-IPSECURITY-12019-03-14Announced
85.208.143.0/24RIPE—MNT-ES-IPSECURITY-12019-03-14Announced
194.169.184.0/24RIPE—ES-SECURITY-1-MNT2018-11-16Announced
194.169.185.0/24RIPE—ES-SECURITY-1-MNT2018-11-16Announced
194.169.186.0/24RIPE—ES-SECURITY-1-MNT2018-11-16Announced
194.169.187.0/24RIPE—ES-SECURITY-1-MNT2018-11-16Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS202047 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-ADAMOEURIPELists AS202047 as a direct member
AS-COMUNITELRIPELists AS202047 as a direct member
AS-VADAVO-TRANSITORIPELists AS202047 as a direct member
AS210612:AS-ASTEORIPELists AS202047 as a direct member
AS3352:AS-TDE-DIBARIPELists AS202047 as a direct member
AS48793:AS-DECIX-MADRIPELists AS202047 as a direct member
AS48793:AS-DECIX-MAD-CONNECTEDRIPELists AS202047 as a direct member
AS48793:AS-DECIX-MAD-RSRIPELists AS202047 as a direct member
AS48793:AS-DECIX-MAD-RS-V6RIPELists AS202047 as a direct member
AS48793:AS-DECIX-MAD-V6RIPELists AS202047 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-20 11:55 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-20. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.