asn.dev

Routing security

AS202029 VIRAK

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 11 of 11 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 13 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

11 observed

Every prefix observed with AS202029 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a04:acc0:10::/44RPKI validIRR30
85.9.104.0/24RPKI validIRR52
91.213.151.0/24RPKI validIRR54
91.213.157.0/24RPKI validIRR54
91.213.167.0/24RPKI validIRR53
91.239.214.0/24RPKI validIRR54
185.212.194.0/24RPKI validIRR54
185.221.193.0/24RPKI validIRR54
195.8.102.0/24RPKI validIRR54
195.8.110.0/24RPKI validIRR53
195.230.107.0/24RPKI validIRR54

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

13 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS202029 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
85.9.104.0/24/24RIPENCC
85.9.106.0/24/24RIPENCC
91.213.151.0/24/24RIPENCC
91.213.157.0/24/24RIPENCC
91.213.167.0/24/24RIPENCC
91.239.214.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.83.90.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.212.194.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.221.193.0/24/24RIPENCC
195.8.102.0/24/24RIPENCC
195.8.110.0/24/24RIPENCC
195.230.107.0/24/24RIPENCC
2a04:acc0:10::/44/44RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

14 objects · 3 not announced

Route objects naming AS202029 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
85.9.106.0/24RIPE—PTE-MNT2023-10-02Not announced
185.83.90.0/24RIPE—PTE-MNT2024-02-18Not announced
185.126.15.0/24RIPE—PTE-MNT2023-10-02Not announced
85.9.104.0/24RIPE—PTE-MNT2023-08-06Announced
91.213.151.0/24RIPE—MNT-HESABGAR2024-12-10Announced
91.213.157.0/24RIPE—MNT-HESABGAR2026-03-29Announced
91.213.167.0/24RIPE—MNT-HESABGAR2026-07-07Announced
91.239.214.0/24RIPE—PTE-MNT2023-01-12Announced
185.212.194.0/24RIPE—VIRAKCLOUD-MNT2022-10-23Announced
185.221.193.0/24RIPE—MNT-HESABGAR2024-12-10Announced
195.8.102.0/24RIPE—MNT-HESABGAR2024-12-10Announced
195.8.110.0/24RIPE—MNT-HESABGAR2026-07-07Announced
195.230.107.0/24RIPE—MNT-HESABGAR2024-08-14Announced
2a04:acc0:10::/44RIPE—MNT-HESABGAR2023-11-21Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS202029 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-HURRICANERADBLists AS202029 as a direct member
AS-TICGWRIPELists AS202029 as a direct member
AS-TRANSROUTE-SPECRIPELists AS202029 as a direct member
AS41194:AS-RASCOMRIPELists AS202029 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-25 14:10 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-25. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.