asn.dev

Routing security

AS201891 NIMBUSIP-AS

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 50 of 50 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 72% 14 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 3 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

50 observed

Every prefix observed with AS201891 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a0f:2743:1000::/48RPKI validNo IRR32
2a0f:2743:1001::/48RPKI validNo IRR32
2a0f:2743:2000::/48RPKI validNo IRR32
2a0f:2743:2001::/48RPKI validNo IRR32
2a0f:2743:3000::/48RPKI validNo IRR32
2a0f:2743:3001::/48RPKI validNo IRR32
2a0f:2743:4000::/48RPKI validNo IRR32
2a0f:2743:4001::/48RPKI validNo IRR31
2a0f:2743:5000::/48RPKI validNo IRR32
2a0f:2743:5001::/48RPKI validNo IRR32
2a0f:2743:6000::/48RPKI validNo IRR32
2a0f:2743:6001::/48RPKI validNo IRR32
2a0f:2743:7000::/48RPKI validNo IRR32
2a0f:2743:7001::/48RPKI validNo IRR31
2a0a:be01::/48RPKI validIRR covering32
2a0a:be01:1::/48RPKI validIRR covering32
2a0a:be01:1000::/48RPKI validIRR covering32
2a0a:be01:1001::/48RPKI validIRR covering32
2a0a:be01:2000::/48RPKI validIRR covering32
2a0a:be01:2001::/48RPKI validIRR covering32
2a0a:be01:3000::/48RPKI validIRR covering32
2a0a:be01:3001::/48RPKI validIRR covering32
2a0a:be01:4000::/48RPKI validIRR covering32
2a0a:be01:4001::/48RPKI validIRR covering32
2a0a:be01:5000::/48RPKI validIRR covering32
2a0a:be01:5001::/48RPKI validIRR covering32
2a0a:be01:6000::/48RPKI validIRR covering32
2a0a:be01:6001::/48RPKI validIRR covering32
2a0a:be01:7000::/48RPKI validIRR covering32
2a0a:be01:7001::/48RPKI validIRR covering32
2a0a:be01:8000::/48RPKI validIRR covering32
2a0a:be01:8001::/48RPKI validIRR covering32
2a0a:be01:9000::/48RPKI validIRR covering32
2a0a:be01:9001::/48RPKI validIRR covering32
2a0a:be01:a000::/48RPKI validIRR covering32
2a0a:be01:a001::/48RPKI validIRR covering32
2a0a:ce02::/48RPKI validIRR covering32
2a0a:ce02:1::/48RPKI validIRR covering32
2a0a:ce02:1000::/48RPKI validIRR covering32
2a0a:ce02:1001::/48RPKI validIRR covering32
2a0a:ce02:2000::/48RPKI validIRR covering32
2a0a:ce02:2001::/48RPKI validIRR covering32
2a0a:ce02:3000::/48RPKI validIRR covering32
2a0a:ce02:3001::/48RPKI validIRR covering32
2a0a:ce02:4000::/48RPKI validIRR covering32
2a0a:ce02:4001::/48RPKI validIRR covering32
2a0a:ce02:5000::/48RPKI validIRR covering32
2a0a:ce02:5001::/48RPKI validIRR covering32
2a0a:ce02:6000::/48RPKI validIRR covering32
2a0a:ce02:6001::/48RPKI validIRR covering31

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

3 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS201891 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
2a0a:be01::/32/48RIPENCC
2a0a:ce02::/32/48RIPENCC
2a0f:2743::/32/48RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

4 objects · 4 not announced

Route objects naming AS201891 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
2a0a:be01::/32RADB—MAINT-AS8342026-04-15Not announced
2a0a:be01::/32RIPE—NETUTILS-MNT2026-04-14Not announced
2a0a:ce02::/32RADB—MAINT-AS8342026-04-15Not announced
2a0a:ce02::/32RIPE—NETUTILS-MNT2026-04-14Not announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS201891 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS13030:AS-CHRIPELists AS201891 as a direct member
AS137409:AS-MERCURYRADBLists AS201891 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-17 12:17 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, collected 2026-10-17. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.