asn.dev

Routing security

AS201884 AM-ISPSUPPORT

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 5 of 5 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 5 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

5 observed

Every prefix observed with AS201884 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
91.103.248.0/24RPKI validIRR53
91.103.249.0/24RPKI validIRR53
91.103.250.0/24RPKI validIRR53
91.103.251.0/24RPKI validIRR53
217.113.9.0/24RPKI validIRR53

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

5 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS201884 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
91.103.248.0/24/24RIPENCC
91.103.249.0/24/24RIPENCC
91.103.250.0/24/24RIPENCC
91.103.251.0/24/24RIPENCC
217.113.9.0/24/24RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

7 objects · 2 not announced

Route objects naming AS201884 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
91.103.248.0/22RIPE—AM-COLMENA1-1-MNT2020-05-02Not announced
2a11:6fc0::/29RIPE—H_VARDGES-MNT2021-10-15Not announced
91.103.248.0/24RIPE—AM-COLMENA1-1-MNT2020-05-02Announced
91.103.249.0/24RIPE—AM-COLMENA1-1-MNT2020-05-02Announced
91.103.250.0/24RIPE—AM-COLMENA1-1-MNT2020-05-02Announced
91.103.251.0/24RIPE—AM-COLMENA1-1-MNT2020-05-02Announced
217.113.9.0/24RIPE—AM-LIR-1-MNT2024-02-05Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS201884 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-ARMENTELRIPELists AS201884 as a direct member
AS-TELARMRIPELists AS201884 as a direct member
AS208339:AS-UTCRIPELists AS201884 as a direct member
AS210147:AS-ALLRIPELists AS201884 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-12 12:10 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-12. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.