asn.dev

Routing security

AS201869 SFV-AS

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 5 of 5 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 6 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

5 observed

Every prefix observed with AS201869 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
156.51.150.0/23RPKI validIRR51
156.51.152.0/21RPKI validIRR52
156.51.160.0/19RPKI validIRR52
156.51.192.0/21RPKI validIRR52
156.51.200.0/24RPKI validIRR51

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

6 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS201869 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
156.51.150.0/23/23RIPENCC
156.51.152.0/21/21RIPENCC
156.51.160.0/19/19RIPENCC
156.51.192.0/21/21RIPENCC
156.51.200.0/24/24RIPENCC
2001:67c:2cfc::/48/48RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

6 objects · 1 not announced

Route objects naming AS201869 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
2001:67c:2cfc::/48RIPEStatens Fastighetsverk , National Property BoardTNSE-MNT2025-11-20Not announced
156.51.150.0/23RIPE—MNT-SE-SFV-12025-06-02Announced
156.51.152.0/21RIPE—MNT-SE-SFV-12025-06-02Announced
156.51.160.0/19RIPE—MNT-SE-SFV-12025-06-02Announced
156.51.192.0/21RIPE—MNT-SE-SFV-12025-06-02Announced
156.51.200.0/24RIPE—MNT-SE-SFV-12025-06-02Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS201869 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-TELENORSE-CUSTRIPELists AS201869 as a direct member
AS-TELIANETSERIPELists AS201869 as a direct member
AS-TELIANETSE-V6RIPELists AS201869 as a direct member
AS8434:AS-TELENOR:AS-CUSTRIPELists AS201869 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-15 12:09 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-15. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.