asn.dev

Routing security

AS201678 ADNET

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 38% 6 of 16 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 10 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 6 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

16 observed

Every prefix observed with AS201678 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
5.194.252.0/22No ROAIRR53
5.194.252.0/24No ROAIRR53
5.194.253.0/24No ROAIRR53
5.194.254.0/24No ROAIRR53
5.194.255.0/24No ROAIRR53
185.66.16.0/22No ROAIRR53
185.66.16.0/24No ROAIRR53
185.66.17.0/24No ROAIRR53
185.66.18.0/24No ROAIRR53
185.66.19.0/24No ROAIRR53
5.195.16.0/22RPKI validIRR53
5.195.16.0/24RPKI validIRR53
5.195.17.0/24RPKI validIRR53
5.195.18.0/24RPKI validIRR53
5.195.19.0/24RPKI validIRR53
5.195.21.0/24RPKI validIRR54

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

6 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS201678 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
5.195.16.0/22/22RIPENCC
5.195.16.0/24/24RIPENCC
5.195.17.0/24/24RIPENCC
5.195.18.0/24/24RIPENCC
5.195.19.0/24/24RIPENCC
5.195.21.0/24/24RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

16 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS201678 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
5.194.252.0/22RADBADNET via EMIXMAINT-AS89662023-11-13Announced
5.194.252.0/24RADBADNET via EMIXMAINT-AS89662023-11-13Announced
5.194.253.0/24RADBADNET via EMIXMAINT-AS89662023-11-13Announced
5.194.254.0/24RADBADNET via EMIXMAINT-AS89662023-11-13Announced
5.194.255.0/24RADBADNET via EMIXMAINT-AS89662023-11-13Announced
5.195.16.0/22RADBADSIC via EMIXMAINT-AS89662023-11-13Announced
5.195.16.0/24RADBADSIC via EMIXMAINT-AS89662023-11-13Announced
5.195.17.0/24RADBADSIC via EMIXMAINT-AS89662023-11-13Announced
5.195.18.0/24RADBADSIC via EMIXMAINT-AS89662023-11-13Announced
5.195.19.0/24RADBADSIC via EMIXMAINT-AS89662023-11-13Announced
5.195.21.0/24RADBADNET via EMIXMAINT-AS89662025-02-19Announced
185.66.16.0/22RADBADNET via EMIXMAINT-AS89662023-11-13Announced
185.66.16.0/24RADBADNET VIA EMIXMAINT-AS89662023-11-13Announced
185.66.17.0/24RADBADNET VIA EMIXMAINT-AS89662023-11-13Announced
185.66.18.0/24RADBADNET VIA EMIXMAINT-AS89662023-11-13Announced
185.66.19.0/24RADBADNET VIA EMIX`MAINT-AS89662023-11-13Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS201678 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-BTELEKOMRIPELists AS201678 as a direct member
AS-EMIXRADBLists AS201678 as a direct member
AS-KDDCUSTOMER2RADBLists AS201678 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-11 12:23 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-11. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.