asn.dev

Routing security

AS201642 NCS-BG-AS

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 8 of 8 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 8 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

8 observed

Every prefix observed with AS201642 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a01:288:4005::/48RPKI validIRR34
2a14:3200:2a14::/48RPKI validIRR34
77.111.66.0/23RPKI validIRR54
85.196.128.0/23RPKI validIRR54
85.196.130.0/23RPKI validIRR54
185.143.237.0/24RPKI validIRR54
185.249.100.0/22RPKI validIRR54
194.164.0.0/23RPKI validIRR54

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

8 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS201642 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
77.111.66.0/23/23RIPENCC
85.196.128.0/23/23RIPENCC
85.196.130.0/23/23RIPENCC
185.143.237.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.249.100.0/22/22RIPENCC
194.164.0.0/23/23RIPENCC
2a01:288:4005::/48/48RIPENCC
2a14:3200:2a14::/48/48RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

9 objects · 1 not announced

Route objects naming AS201642 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
2a14:3200::/32RIPENetCom Service Ltd.NCS-BG-MNT2023-10-30Not announced
77.111.66.0/23RIPE—NCS-BG-MNT2025-04-25Announced
85.196.128.0/23RIPEMobiltel PA SpaceSPNET-MNT2014-09-12Announced
85.196.130.0/23RIPEMobiltel PA SpaceSPNET-MNT2015-04-15Announced
185.143.237.0/24RIPE—NCS-BG-MNT2025-06-27Announced
185.249.100.0/22RIPE—NCS-BG-MNT2025-06-25Announced
194.164.0.0/23RIPE—NCS-BG-MNT2024-01-07Announced
2a01:288:4005::/48RIPE—SPNET-MNT2021-08-31Announced
2a14:3200:2a14::/48RIPE—NCS-BG-MNT2023-11-02Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS201642 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-57344RIPELists AS201642 as a direct member
AS-BTC-UPRIPELists AS201642 as a direct member
AS-BTELOUTRIPELists AS201642 as a direct member
AS-BTELOUT-V6RIPELists AS201642 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS201642 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V4RIPELists AS201642 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V6RIPELists AS201642 as a direct member
AS-SPNETRIPELists AS201642 as a direct member
AS8717:AS-A1BGRIPELists AS201642 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-15 12:09 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-15. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.