asn.dev

Routing security

AS201167 CASTEL-AS

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 71% 12 of 17 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 5 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 12 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

17 observed

Every prefix observed with AS201167 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a01:49e0::/32No ROAIRR35
185.43.188.0/24No ROAIRR covering53
185.43.189.0/24No ROAIRR covering53
185.43.190.0/24No ROAIRR covering53
185.43.191.0/24No ROAIRR covering53
62.212.235.0/24RPKI validIRR53
85.132.8.0/24RPKI validIRR53
85.132.9.0/24RPKI validIRR53
85.132.10.0/24RPKI validIRR53
85.132.11.0/24RPKI validIRR53
85.132.97.0/24RPKI validIRR53
94.20.42.0/24RPKI validIRR53
94.20.52.0/24RPKI validIRR53
94.20.96.0/24RPKI validIRR53
94.20.97.0/24RPKI validIRR53
94.20.98.0/24RPKI validIRR53
94.20.99.0/24RPKI validIRR53

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

12 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS201167 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
62.212.235.0/24/24RIPENCC
85.132.8.0/24/24RIPENCC
85.132.9.0/24/24RIPENCC
85.132.10.0/24/24RIPENCC
85.132.11.0/24/24RIPENCC
85.132.97.0/24/24RIPENCC
94.20.42.0/24/24RIPENCC
94.20.52.0/24/24RIPENCC
94.20.96.0/24/24RIPENCC
94.20.97.0/24/24RIPENCC
94.20.98.0/24/24RIPENCC
94.20.99.0/24/24RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

14 objects · 1 not announced

Route objects naming AS201167 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
185.43.188.0/22RIPECaspian Telecom CGNMNT-CASP-TEL2015-01-25Not announced
62.212.235.0/24RIPECASTELMNT-DELTA-TEL2025-07-04Announced
85.132.8.0/24RIPECASTELMNT-DELTA-TEL2025-07-04Announced
85.132.9.0/24RIPECASTELMNT-DELTA-TEL2025-07-04Announced
85.132.10.0/24RIPECASTELMNT-DELTA-TEL2025-07-04Announced
85.132.11.0/24RIPECASTELMNT-DELTA-TEL2025-07-04Announced
85.132.97.0/24RIPECASTELMNT-DELTA-TEL2025-07-09Announced
94.20.42.0/24RIPECASTELMNT-DELTA-TEL2025-07-04Announced
94.20.52.0/24RIPECASTELMNT-DELTA-TEL2025-07-04Announced
94.20.96.0/24RIPECASTELMNT-DELTA-TEL2025-07-09Announced
94.20.97.0/24RIPECASTELMNT-DELTA-TEL2025-07-04Announced
94.20.98.0/24RIPECASTELMNT-DELTA-TEL2025-07-04Announced
94.20.99.0/24RIPECASTELMNT-DELTA-TEL2025-07-04Announced
2a01:49e0::/32RIPECaspian Telecom IPv6 NetworkCASTEL2015-01-13Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS201167 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-AZERSATMEMBERSRIPELists AS201167 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS201167 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V4RIPELists AS201167 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V6RIPELists AS201167 as a direct member
AS-TRANSROUTE-SPECRIPELists AS201167 as a direct member
AS41194:AS-RASCOMRIPELists AS201167 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-16 12:09 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-16. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.