asn.dev

Routing security

AS200993 NYANET NyaNet

Hosting RIPE Content

RPKI valid 67% 2 of 3 announcements
RPKI invalid 1 dropped by validating networks
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 8 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

3 observed

Every prefix observed with AS200993 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a12:4141:dc12::/48RPKI invalid · lengthIRR covering5
91.193.111.0/24RPKI validIRR52
2001:678:978::/48RPKI validIRR31

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

8 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS200993 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
91.193.111.0/24/24RIPENCC
178.250.187.0/24/24RIPENCC
2001:678:978::/48/48RIPENCC
2a01:ecc0:6f4::/46/46RIPENCC
2a07:54c2:b00b::/48/48RIPENCC
2a12:4141::/32/32RIPENCC
2a12:4141::/48/48RIPENCC
2a12:4141:fa00::/40/40RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

8 declared

This network has signed an ASPA record naming its transit providers. Each is compared against the upstreams observed in routing paths.

ASNetworkASPARouting paths
AS6939Hurricane Electric LLCDeclarednot observed
AS31500Global Network Management IncDeclarednot observed
AS35598INETCOM CARRIER LLCDeclaredObserved
AS56584InterEdge B.V.Declarednot observed
AS56740DataHata LtdDeclarednot observed
AS61400Start2 LLCDeclaredObserved
AS62255BiMajLink d.o.o.Declarednot observed
AS213753InterEdge B.V.Declarednot observed

An observed upstream that is not declared is not necessarily a leak: our upstream inference cannot tell a transit provider from a peer seen in the same position. A declared provider that is never observed is usually a backup path.

IRR

Registered route objects

10 objects · 8 not announced

Route objects naming AS200993 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
2a06:de00:a0::/44RIPE—NYA-MNT2026-01-10Not announced
2a07:54c2:b00b::/48RIPEYanislav BasiukLIR-IS-KTT-1-MNT2024-01-02Not announced
2a10:ccc1:1333::/48RIPE—NYA-MNT2025-12-27Not announced
2a10:ccc1:1337::/48RIPE—ABCD2K-MNT2024-12-31Not announced
2a12:4141::/32RIPEAnyRouteNYA-MNT2026-04-14Not announced
2a12:4141::/48RIPE—IP-RIPE2026-02-03Not announced
2a12:4141:dead::/48RIPEExplicit routing for another DC in Moscow [TEST SUBNET 1]IP-RIPE2025-08-11Not announced
2a12:4141:fa00::/40RIPE—NYA-MNT2026-04-14Not announced
91.193.111.0/24RIPE—APNET-MNT2026-06-12Announced
2001:678:978::/48RIPE—YANBAS-MNT2026-02-04Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS200993 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS200993:AS-COREPeeringDBDeclared by the operator as its own set
AS-4IXPRIPELists AS200993 as a direct member
AS-4IXP-RSRIPELists AS200993 as a direct member
AS-4IXPV4RIPELists AS200993 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANERADBLists AS200993 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS200993 as a direct member
AS-ICNETRIPELists AS200993 as a direct member
AS-MELBICOMRADBLists AS200993 as a direct member
AS-MELBICOMRIPELists AS200993 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V6RIPELists AS200993 as a direct member
AS-TRANSROUTE-SPECRIPELists AS200993 as a direct member
AS200993:AS-OURRIPELists AS200993 as a direct member
AS200993:AS-POP:AS-AMSRIPELists AS200993 as a direct member
AS200993:AS-POP:AS-ARNRIPELists AS200993 as a direct member
AS200993:AS-POP:AS-DMERIPELists AS200993 as a direct member
AS200993:AS-POP:AS-MSQRIPELists AS200993 as a direct member
AS200993:AS-POP:AS-SVORIPELists AS200993 as a direct member
AS209533:AS-BGPTUNNELRIPELists AS200993 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-12 12:10 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-12. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.