asn.dev

Routing security

AS200890 BMIP

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 9 of 9 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 3 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

9 observed

Every prefix observed with AS200890 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a0a:6040:d400::/48RPKI validIRR covering34
2a0a:6040:d401::/48RPKI validIRR covering34
2a06:a005:1b60::/48RPKI validIRR34
2a06:a005:1b61::/48RPKI validIRR34
2a10:cc40:180::/48RPKI validIRR35
2a10:cc40:181::/48RPKI validIRR covering34
2a10:cc40:186::/48RPKI validIRR covering30
2a10:cc40:188::/48RPKI validIRR35
2a10:cc40:189::/48RPKI validIRR covering33

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

3 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS200890 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
2a06:a005:1b60::/44/48RIPENCC
2a0a:6040:d400::/40/48RIPENCC
2a10:cc40:180::/44/48RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

7 objects · 3 not announced

Route objects naming AS200890 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
2a0a:6040:d400::/40RIPE—ISKONE-MNT2023-05-02Not announced
2a0e:b107:1e50::/44RIPE—ISKONE-MNT2024-11-30Not announced
2a10:cc40:180::/44RIPE—ISKONE-MNT2024-11-30Not announced
2a06:a005:1b60::/48RIPE—ISKONE-MNT2023-11-18Announced
2a06:a005:1b61::/48RIPE—ISKONE-MNT2023-11-18Announced
2a10:cc40:180::/48RIPE—ISKONE-MNT2023-11-18Announced
2a10:cc40:188::/48RIPE—ISKONE-MNT2023-11-18Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS200890 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS200890:AS-ISKONEPeeringDBDeclared by the operator as its own set
AS-400304-DOWNSTREAMSARINLists AS200890 as a direct member
AS-4IXPRIPELists AS200890 as a direct member
AS-4IXP-RSRIPELists AS200890 as a direct member
AS-4IXPV6RIPELists AS200890 as a direct member
AS-CRUNCHBITS-SPOARINLists AS200890 as a direct member
AS-CRUNCHBITS-TESTARINLists AS200890 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS200890 as a direct member
AS-IFOGALTDBLists AS200890 as a direct member
AS-IFOGRIPELists AS200890 as a direct member
AS200890:AS-ISKONERIPELists AS200890 as a direct member
AS206075:AS-RIPERIPELists AS200890 as a direct member
AS209533:AS-BGPTUNNELRIPELists AS200890 as a direct member
AS212027:AS-CUSTOMERSRIPELists AS200890 as a direct member
AS53667:AS-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS200890 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-15 12:09 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-15. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.