asn.dev

Routing security

AS200729 MCIT

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 74% 14 of 19 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 5 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 8 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

19 observed

Every prefix observed with AS200729 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
188.72.128.0/18No ROAIRR53
188.72.128.0/24No ROAIRR53
188.72.133.0/24No ROAIRR covering53
188.72.134.0/24No ROAIRR covering53
188.72.189.0/24No ROAIRR53
5.191.240.0/20RPKI validIRR53
5.191.242.0/24RPKI validIRR covering53
5.191.251.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
5.191.252.0/23RPKI validIRR covering52
85.132.83.0/24RPKI validIRR53
94.20.86.0/24RPKI validIRR53
185.96.124.0/24RPKI validIRR covering53
185.96.125.0/24RPKI validIRR53
185.96.126.0/24RPKI validIRR53
185.96.127.0/24RPKI validIRR52
185.143.196.0/22RPKI validIRR53
185.143.197.0/24RPKI validIRR51
185.143.198.0/24RPKI validIRR51
185.143.199.0/24RPKI validIRR51

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

8 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS200729 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
5.191.240.0/20/24RIPENCC
85.132.83.0/24/24RIPENCC
94.20.86.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.96.124.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.96.125.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.96.126.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.96.127.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.143.196.0/22/24RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

21 objects · 8 not announced

Route objects naming AS200729 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
185.96.124.0/22RIPE—SM25252019-07-19Not announced
185.143.196.0/24RIPE—SM25252023-04-14Not announced
188.72.150.0/24RIPE—SM25252025-11-22Not announced
188.72.161.0/24RIPE—SM25252024-03-27Not announced
188.72.184.0/24RIPE—SM25252023-11-01Not announced
188.72.185.0/24RIPE—SM25252023-11-01Not announced
188.72.186.0/24RIPE—SM25252023-11-01Not announced
188.72.187.0/24RIPE—SM25252023-11-01Not announced
5.191.240.0/20RIPE—SM25252025-03-01Announced
85.132.83.0/24RIPEAzInTelecom LLCMNT-DELTA-TEL2025-07-09Announced
94.20.86.0/24RIPEAzInTelecom LLCMNT-DELTA-TEL2025-07-09Announced
185.96.125.0/24RIPE—SM25252019-07-19Announced
185.96.126.0/24RIPE—SM25252019-07-19Announced
185.96.127.0/24RIPE—SM25252019-07-19Announced
185.143.196.0/22RIPE—SM25252023-04-14Announced
185.143.197.0/24RIPE—SM25252023-04-14Announced
185.143.198.0/24RIPE—SM25252023-04-14Announced
185.143.199.0/24RIPE—SM25252023-04-14Announced
188.72.128.0/18RIPE—SM25252025-09-02Announced
188.72.128.0/24RIPE—SM25252024-03-27Announced
188.72.189.0/24RIPE—SM25252025-02-26Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS200729 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-AZERSATMEMBERSRIPELists AS200729 as a direct member
AS-AZRT-AZRIPELists AS200729 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V4RIPELists AS200729 as a direct member
AS-TRANSROUTE-SPECRIPELists AS200729 as a direct member
AS34170:AS-CUSTOMERSRIPELists AS200729 as a direct member
AS41194:AS-RASCOMRIPELists AS200729 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-14 18:17 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-14. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.