asn.dev

Routing security

AS200586 CAKNING-

Unclassified RIPE Educational/Research

RPKI valid 100% 7 of 7 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 4 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

7 observed

Every prefix observed with AS200586 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a06:9801:8b::/48RPKI validIRR34
2a14:7583:e600::/40RPKI validIRR34
2a14:7583:e610::/48RPKI validIRR33
2a14:7583:e620::/48RPKI validIRR33
2a14:7583:e630::/48RPKI validIRR33
2a14:7583:e640::/48RPKI validIRR33
2a14:7583:e650::/48RPKI validIRR33

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

4 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS200586 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
2a06:9801:8b::/48/48RIPENCC
2a12:bec0:a0::/44/48RIPENCC
2a12:bec0:b0::/44/48RIPENCC
2a14:7583:e600::/40/48RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

8 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS200586 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
2a06:9801:8b::/48RIPE—AHMAD-MUNIR-MNT2026-02-28Announced
2a14:7583:e600::/40RADBVultr Customer RouteMAINT-AS204732026-09-26Announced
2a14:7583:e600::/40RIPE—AHMAD-MUNIR-MNT2026-03-03Announced
2a14:7583:e610::/48RIPE—AHMAD-MUNIR-MNT2026-03-10Announced
2a14:7583:e620::/48RIPE—AHMAD-MUNIR-MNT2026-03-10Announced
2a14:7583:e630::/48RIPE—AHMAD-MUNIR-MNT2026-03-14Announced
2a14:7583:e640::/48RIPE—AHMAD-MUNIR-MNT2026-03-14Announced
2a14:7583:e650::/48RIPE—AHMAD-MUNIR-MNT2026-03-14Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS200586 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS200586:AS-SETPeeringDBDeclared by the operator as its own set
AS-FOGIXPRIPELists AS200586 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS200586 as a direct member
AS-IFOGRIPELists AS200586 as a direct member
AS-JOINTTRANSITRIPELists AS200586 as a direct member
AS-JOINTTRANSIT-IPV6RIPELists AS200586 as a direct member
AS-MELBICOMRADBLists AS200586 as a direct member
AS-MELBICOMRIPELists AS200586 as a direct member
AS-OPENPEERINGRIPELists AS200586 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V6RIPELists AS200586 as a direct member
AS-TSCHAJERARIPELists AS200586 as a direct member
AS20473:AS-VULTRRADBLists AS200586 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-15 12:09 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-15. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.