asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS199711 NCISA-AS National Cyber and Information Security Agency

Unclassified APNIC

IPv4 addresses 768 2 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 1 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly CZ
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 2 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

National Cyber and Information Security Agency

Czechia · AI-generated

government security agency

NCISA-AS is operated by the National Cyber and Information Security Agency.

What it's used for

  • The address space carries agency infrastructure, identified by netnames NUKIB-BRNO and NUKIB-PRAHA associated with the agency's Brno and Prague locations.
  • The AS announces 768 IPv4 addresses across 2 prefixes and 1 IPv6 prefix, with only 2 observed neighbours, indicating a small, self-contained government network rather than a transit or access provider.
  • Traffic from this AS consists of internal agency communications and cybersecurity operations for the Czech Republic's national cyber defense.

Notable

  • Registrants for both announced prefixes are NCISA Admins; National Cyber and Information Security Agency, fully consistent with the AS holder.
  • The address inventory is finely subdivided into two distinct prefixes corresponding to specific geographic sites (Brno and Prague), reflecting a segmented internal corporate estate.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

2 upstream, 0 downstream and 3 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS2852CESNET z.s.p.o.185
AS15935ha-vel internet s.r.o.9

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-11-06, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 2 prefixes · 768 addresses IPv6 1 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
CZCzechia3

Registry

Allocation record

APNIC · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
APNIC
Handle
AS199711
Registry name
NCISA-AS
Registrant
NBUCZ-MNT
Abuse contact
abuse@nukib.gov.cz
Registered
2014-02-28
Last changed
2022-11-04
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
100% valid · 4 valid, 0 with no ROA
ROAs
2 authorising AS199711
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 4 of 4 announcements
Route objects
8 naming AS199711

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 454 networks and 1,854 prefixes, as published 2026-11-06. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check