Autonomous system
AS198966 FILL
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
Fill Networks
isp residential estonia access
FILL is operated by Fill Networks OU.
What it's used for
- The address space carries residential broadband access, evidenced by reverse DNS entries such as
pool-91-146-79-255.bng1.fill.eeandpool-185-153-145-0.bng1.fill.ee, which indicate Broadband Network Gateway (BNG) pools. - The AS announces 9,216 IPv4 addresses across 2 prefixes in Estonia, with only 1 observed neighbour, a ratio characteristic of an access network serving local subscribers rather than a transit provider.
- Traffic consists of subscriber eyeballs for wired, wireless, and satellite telecommunication services provided by the operator in Narva, Estonia.
Notable
- Registrants for both announced prefixes (
EE-FILLNETWORKS-20110908andEE-FILLNETWORKS-20160524) align with the AS holder, Fill Networks OU. - The inventory consists of two distinct IPv4 blocks: a /19 and a /22, both located in Estonia.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Transit providers
1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
| AS | Network | Paths seen |
|---|---|---|
| AS3327 | CITIC Telecom CPC Netherlands B.V. | 120 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-28, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 2 prefixes · 9.22K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| EE | Estonia | 2 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS198966- Registry name
- FILL
- Registrant
- lir-ee-fillnetworks-1-MNT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@fill.ee
- Registered
- 2012-07-04
- Last changed
- 2026-07-08
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 2 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 2 authorising AS198966
- ASPA
- 2 declared providers
- IRR
- 100% registered · 2 of 2 announcements
- Route objects
- 2 naming AS198966
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 448 networks and 1,849 prefixes, as published 2026-10-29. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere