asn.dev

Routing security

AS198710 UUU-TELECOM-AS

Unclassified RIPE NSP

RPKI valid 60% 9 of 15 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 6 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 93% 0 missing · 1 other origin
ROAs 10 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

15 observed

Every prefix observed with AS198710 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a05:8e40::/29No ROAIRR30
91.213.21.0/24No ROAIRR53
185.82.84.0/22No ROAIRR53
193.28.88.0/24No ROAIRR53
193.142.97.0/24No ROAIRR53
195.78.240.0/22No ROAIRR53
83.125.108.0/24RPKI validIRR other origin53
2a05:e700::/29RPKI validIRR30
80.86.180.0/24RPKI validIRR53
81.209.132.0/24RPKI validIRR53
81.209.151.0/24RPKI validIRR53
81.209.154.0/23RPKI validIRR53
81.209.159.0/24RPKI validIRR53
83.125.106.0/23RPKI validIRR53
91.217.174.0/24RPKI validIRR53

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

10 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS198710 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
80.86.180.0/24/24RIPENCC
80.86.186.0/24/24RIPENCC
81.209.132.0/24/24RIPENCC
81.209.151.0/24/24RIPENCC
81.209.154.0/23/24RIPENCC
81.209.159.0/24/24RIPENCC
83.125.106.0/23/23RIPENCC
83.125.108.0/24/24RIPENCC
91.217.174.0/24/24RIPENCC
2a05:e700::/29/29RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

15 objects · 1 not announced

Route objects naming AS198710 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
80.86.186.0/24RIPE—EUNX-MNT2023-07-26Not announced
80.86.180.0/24RIPE—LNC-MNT2016-12-28Announced
81.209.132.0/24RIPE—LNC-MNT2016-12-28Announced
81.209.151.0/24RIPE—MNT-3U2017-05-26Announced
81.209.154.0/23RIPE—MNT-3U2017-07-27Announced
81.209.159.0/24RIPE—MNT-3U2017-05-26Announced
83.125.106.0/23RIPE3ULNC-MNT2014-09-24Announced
91.213.21.0/24RIPEHOSTHOUSING-NET via 3UMNT-3U2014-12-04Announced
91.217.174.0/24RIPEDeutscheOnlineAgenturGmbHMNT-3U2021-10-21Announced
185.82.84.0/22RIPE3UMNT-3U2016-09-20Announced
193.28.88.0/24RIPEBUSOFT-NET via 3UMNT-3U2014-12-03Announced
193.142.97.0/24RIPEyipl GmbHMNT-3U2021-10-05Announced
195.78.240.0/22RIPEalaw GmbHMNT-3U2021-10-11Announced
2a05:8e40::/29RIPE3U TelecomMNT-3U2015-02-09Announced
2a05:e700::/29RIPE—MNT-3U2018-02-21Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS198710 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-3URIPELists AS198710 as a direct member
AS-3UTELECOMRIPELists AS198710 as a direct member
AS-GLOBEINTERNET-CLIENTSARINLists AS198710 as a direct member
AS-GLOBEINTERNET-CLIENTSRIPELists AS198710 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-23 12:03 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-23. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.