asn.dev

Routing security

AS196855 LEKTORKLETT

Unclassified APNIC

RPKI valid 0% 0 of 1 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 1 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 0 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

1 observed

Every prefix observed with AS196855 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
193.104.161.0/24No ROAIRR52

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

0 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS196855 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

No ROA names this AS as an authorised origin.

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

1 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS196855 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
193.104.161.0/24RIPEWydawnictwo LektorKlett Sp. z o.o.NETIA-MNT2012-11-22Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS196855 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-ICPNETRIPELists AS196855 as a direct member
AS-NETIA-MSK-IXRIPELists AS196855 as a direct member
AS-NETIA-PEERINGRIPELists AS196855 as a direct member
AS5617:AS-PLRIPELists AS196855 as a direct member
AS9112:AS-POZMAN-1014RIPELists AS196855 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-17 12:17 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, collected 2026-10-17. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.