asn.dev

Routing security

AS19595 SDHU

Unclassified ARIN

RPKI valid 0% 0 of 4 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 4 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 0 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

4 observed

Every prefix observed with AS19595 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
74.120.72.0/24No ROAIRR covering57
74.120.73.0/24No ROAIRR covering57
74.120.74.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
74.120.75.0/24No ROAIRR covering51

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

0 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS19595 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

No ROA names this AS as an authorised origin.

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

1 objects · 1 not announced

Route objects naming AS19595 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
74.120.72.0/22RADBProxy registered for SDRHUMAINT-AS56902023-11-13Not announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS19595 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-HURRICANERADBLists AS19595 as a direct member
AS-VIANET-CARADBLists AS19595 as a direct member
AS11522:AS-TRANSIT-PEERSRADBLists AS19595 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-25 14:10 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-25. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.