asn.dev

Routing security

AS19 LEIDOS-AS

Unclassified ARIN

RPKI valid 0% 0 of 29 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 29 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 0 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

29 observed

Every prefix observed with AS19 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
140.162.0.0/16No ROAIRR53
140.162.8.0/23No ROAIRR covering53
140.162.10.0/23No ROAIRR covering53
140.162.12.0/23No ROAIRR covering53
140.162.16.0/23No ROAIRR covering53
140.162.24.0/21No ROAIRR covering53
140.162.32.0/23No ROAIRR covering53
140.162.40.0/21No ROAIRR covering53
140.162.48.0/22No ROAIRR covering53
140.162.64.0/18No ROAIRR covering53
140.162.128.0/18No ROAIRR covering53
140.162.190.0/23No ROAIRR covering53
140.162.191.0/24No ROAIRR covering53
140.162.192.0/18No ROAIRR covering53
140.162.254.0/23No ROAIRR covering53
140.162.255.0/24No ROAIRR covering53
149.8.0.0/16No ROAIRR53
149.8.0.0/17No ROAIRR covering53
149.8.46.0/23No ROAIRR covering53
149.8.128.0/17No ROAIRR covering53
192.5.8.0/24No ROAIRR53
192.33.134.0/24No ROAIRR53
192.131.125.0/24No ROAIRR53
192.132.104.0/24No ROAIRR53
204.115.176.0/21No ROAIRR53
205.153.240.0/22No ROAIRR53
2620:11c:8000::/36No ROAIRR31
2620:11c:8000::/40No ROAIRR covering31
2620:11c:8800::/40No ROAIRR covering31

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

0 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS19 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

No ROA names this AS as an authorised origin.

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

11 objects · 1 not announced

Route objects naming AS19 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
149.8.0.0/22RADBV4-PUB-CB-ANNOUNCEDMAINT-AS227732024-09-25Not announced
140.162.0.0/16RADBCyrusOne-Proxy for CustomerMAINT-AS622023-11-13Announced
149.8.0.0/16ARINLeidosMNT-LEIDO2014-11-13Announced
149.8.0.0/16RADBCyrusOne-Customer PrefixMAINT-AS622023-11-13Announced
192.5.8.0/24RADBCyrusOne-Customer PrefixMAINT-AS622023-11-13Announced
192.33.134.0/24RADBCyrusOne-Customer PrefixMAINT-AS622023-11-13Announced
192.131.125.0/24RADBCyrusOne-Customer PrefixMAINT-AS622023-11-13Announced
192.132.104.0/24RADBCyrusOne-Customer PrefixMAINT-AS622023-11-13Announced
204.115.176.0/21RADBCyrusOne-Customer PrefixMAINT-AS622023-11-13Announced
205.153.240.0/22RADBCyrusOne-Customer PrefixMAINT-AS622023-11-13Announced
2620:11c:8000::/36RADBCyrusOne-Customer PrefixMAINT-AS622023-11-13Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS19 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-C1RADBLists AS19 as a direct member
AS-C1-IPV6RADBLists AS19 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-30 12:03 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-30. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.