asn.dev

Routing security

AS18756 PATEAM

Unclassified ARIN

RPKI valid 0% 0 of 25 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 25 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 92% 2 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 0 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

25 observed

Every prefix observed with AS18756 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
8.20.65.0/24No ROANo IRR51
8.38.177.0/24No ROANo IRR50
164.156.0.0/16No ROAIRR25
164.156.0.0/20No ROAIRR covering25
164.156.16.0/23No ROAIRR covering25
164.156.18.0/24No ROAIRR covering25
164.156.19.0/24No ROAIRR covering25
164.156.20.0/22No ROAIRR covering25
164.156.24.0/21No ROAIRR covering25
164.156.32.0/19No ROAIRR covering25
164.156.64.0/18No ROAIRR covering25
164.156.128.0/17No ROAIRR covering25
164.157.0.0/17No ROAIRR covering25
164.157.128.0/18No ROAIRR covering25
164.157.192.0/19No ROAIRR covering25
164.157.248.0/22No ROAIRR covering25
164.157.255.0/24No ROAIRR covering25
199.5.64.0/18No ROAIRR25
199.20.128.0/17No ROAIRR25
199.79.0.0/20No ROAIRR25
205.172.72.0/21No ROAIRR25
205.172.80.0/20No ROAIRR25
205.172.96.0/21No ROAIRR25
205.172.104.0/22No ROAIRR25
206.224.0.0/19No ROAIRR25

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

0 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS18756 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

No ROA names this AS as an authorised origin.

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

11 objects · 2 not announced

Route objects naming AS18756 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
164.156.0.0/15NTTCOMCommonwealth of PennsylvaniaMAINT-NTTCOM-RA2007-04-13Not announced
164.157.0.0/16NTTCOMCommonwealth of PennsylvaniaMAINT-NTTCOM-RA2007-04-13Not announced
164.156.0.0/16NTTCOMCommonwealth of PennsylvaniaMAINT-NTTCOM-RA2007-04-13Announced
199.5.64.0/18NTTCOMCommonwealth of PennsylvaniaMAINT-NTTCOM-RA2007-04-13Announced
199.20.128.0/17NTTCOMCommonwealth of PennsylvaniaMAINT-NTTCOM-RA2007-04-13Announced
199.79.0.0/20NTTCOMCommonwealth of PennsylvaniaMAINT-NTTCOM-RA2007-04-13Announced
205.172.72.0/21NTTCOMCommonwealth of PennsylvaniaMAINT-NTTCOM-RA2007-04-13Announced
205.172.80.0/20NTTCOMCommonwealth of PennsylvaniaMAINT-NTTCOM-RA2007-04-13Announced
205.172.96.0/21NTTCOMCommonwealth of PennsylvaniaMAINT-NTTCOM-RA2007-04-13Announced
205.172.104.0/22NTTCOMCommonwealth of PennsylvaniaMAINT-NTTCOM-RA2007-04-13Announced
206.224.0.0/19NTTCOMCommonwealth of PennsylvaniaMAINT-NTTCOM-RA2007-04-13Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS18756 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-COMCAST-EDIARADBLists AS18756 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-19 12:02 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-19. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.