Autonomous system
AS18515 UTARLINGTON
Unclassified ARIN
Summary
University of Texas at Arlington
education business university
The AS handle UTARLINGTON is operated by University of Texas at Arlington.
What it's used for
- The address space carries the university's internal network infrastructure, as indicated by the netname
UTARLINGTONand registrantUniversity of Texas at Arlington. - The AS announces 65536 IPv4 addresses within a single /16 prefix (129.107.0.0/16) and one IPv6 prefix (2602:fd0f::/36). With only 3 observed neighbours, the low neighbour-to-address ratio suggests an access or internal campus network rather than a transit provider.
Notable
- The RDAP registrant matches the AS holder, confirming the space is owned and operated by the University of Texas at Arlington.
- The address inventory consists of a single contiguous IPv4 block and one IPv6 prefix, typical of a large institutional allocation.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-20, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 1 prefixes · 65.54K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| US | United States of America | 2 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- ARIN
- Handle
AS18515- Registry name
- UTARLINGTON
- Registrant
- University of Texas at Arlington
- Abuse contact
- abuse@uta.edu
- Registered
- 2000-09-07
- Last changed
- 2021-01-21
- Allocation
- assigned
Declared
PeeringDB profile
- Name
- UTARLINGTON
- Scope
- Not Disclosed
- Traffic ratio
- Not Disclosed
PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 2 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 2 authorising AS18515
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 2 of 2 announcements
- Route objects
- 4 naming AS18515
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,779 prefixes, as published 2026-10-21. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere