asn.dev

Routing security

AS18366 APNIC-ANYCAST - Asia Pacific Network Information Centre

Unclassified APNIC

RPKI valid 100% 2 of 2 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 2 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

2 observed

Every prefix observed with AS18366 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
202.12.31.0/24RPKI validIRR55
2001:dd8:12::/48RPKI validIRR33

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

2 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS18366 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
202.12.31.0/24/24APNIC
2001:dd8:12::/48/48APNIC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

3 declared

This network has signed an ASPA record naming its transit providers. Each is compared against the upstreams observed in routing paths.

ASNetworkASPARouting paths
AS4608Asia Pacific Network Information CentreDeclaredObserved
AS4777Asia Pacific Network Information CentreDeclaredObserved
AS20473The Constant Company, LLCDeclaredObserved

An observed upstream that is not declared is not necessarily a leak: our upstream inference cannot tell a transit provider from a peer seen in the same position. A declared provider that is never observed is usually a backup path.

IRR

Registered route objects

3 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS18366 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
202.12.31.0/24APNICAPNIC DNS AnycastMAINT-APNIC-IS-AP2018-11-20Announced
2001:dd8:12::/48APNICAPNIC Anycast NetworkMAINT-APNIC-IS-AP2018-11-20Announced
2001:dd8:12::/48RADBVultr Customer RouteMAINT-AS204732026-09-26Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS18366 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-4641NTTNTTCOMLists AS18366 as a direct member
AS-BTN-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS18366 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS18366 as a direct member
AS-IIJRADBLists AS18366 as a direct member
AS-IIJ6RADBLists AS18366 as a direct member
AS-KDDCUSTOMER2RADBLists AS18366 as a direct member
AS-SKBROADBANDRADBLists AS18366 as a direct member
AS-TELSTRA-INTL-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS18366 as a direct member
AS20473:AS-VULTRRADBLists AS18366 as a direct member
AS20965:AS-FROM-TEIN-TO-GEANTRIPELists AS18366 as a direct member
AS2497:AS-IIJRADBLists AS18366 as a direct member
AS2497:AS-IIJ6RADBLists AS18366 as a direct member
AS293:AS-FROM-SINGAREN-TO-ESNETARINLists AS18366 as a direct member
AS4608:AS-CUSTOMERSAPNICLists AS18366 as a direct member
AS4641:AS-CUHK-TRANSITAPNICLists AS18366 as a direct member
AS4777:AS-DOWNSTREAMAPNICLists AS18366 as a direct member
AS7545:AS-TPGN-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS18366 as a direct member
AS7606:AS-NSW-IXRADBLists AS18366 as a direct member
AS7606:AS-QLD-IXRADBLists AS18366 as a direct member
AS7606:AS-VIC-IXRADBLists AS18366 as a direct member
AS7606:AS-WA-IXRADBLists AS18366 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-11-08 13:05 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-11-08. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.