Autonomous system
AS18025 BTTELECOM-AS-AP Bhutan Telecom Ltd
Unclassified APNIC
Summary
Bhutan Telecom
telecom residential mobile isp
BTTELECOM-AS-AP is operated by Bhutan Telecom Ltd.
What it's used for
- The address space carries customer-facing traffic, evidenced by reverse DNS entries such as
45-64-249-126.swr.druknet.btand45-64-250-64.host.druknet.bt. - The network announces 768 IPv4 addresses across 2 prefixes with only 1 observed neighbour, a ratio indicative of an access or eyeball network rather than a transit provider.
Notable
- Registrants for both announced prefixes (
45.64.248.0/23and45.64.250.0/24) are listed as Bhutan Telecom Ltd, matching the AS holder. - Bhutan Telecom Ltd was established on July 1, 2000, as a fully state-owned company following the corporatization of the erstwhile Department of Telecommunications.
- The inventory consists of two small IPv4 blocks with no announced IPv6 prefixes.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Transit providers
1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
| AS | Network | Paths seen |
|---|---|---|
| AS17660 | DrukNet ISP | 118 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-13, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 2 prefixes · 768 addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| BT | Bhutan | 2 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS18025- Registry name
- BTTELECOM-AS-AP
- Registrant
- Bhutan Telecom Ltd
- Abuse contact
- systems@bt.bt
- Registered
- 2018-02-27
- Last changed
- 2021-01-14
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 2 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 3 authorising AS18025
- ASPA
- 1 declared providers
- IRR
- 100% registered · 2 of 2 announcements
- Route objects
- 51 naming AS18025
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 440 networks and 1,773 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere