asn.dev

Routing security

AS16800 NBS90

Unclassified LACNIC

RPKI valid 0% 0 of 21 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 21 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 4 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

21 observed

Every prefix observed with AS16800 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
163.199.7.0/24No ROAIRR covering13
163.199.8.0/24No ROAIRR covering13
163.199.76.0/24No ROAIRR covering13
163.199.126.0/24No ROAIRR covering53
163.199.128.0/24No ROAIRR covering15
163.199.129.0/24No ROAIRR covering13
163.199.131.0/24No ROAIRR covering13
163.199.150.0/24No ROAIRR covering53
163.199.160.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
163.199.223.0/24No ROAIRR covering13
163.201.8.0/24No ROAIRR covering13
163.201.92.0/24No ROAIRR covering13
163.201.93.0/24No ROAIRR covering13
163.201.94.0/24No ROAIRR covering13
163.201.100.0/24No ROAIRR covering53
163.201.128.0/24No ROAIRR covering15
163.201.129.0/24No ROAIRR covering13
163.201.131.0/24No ROAIRR covering13
163.201.139.0/24No ROAIRR covering53
163.201.150.0/24No ROAIRR covering53
163.201.223.0/24No ROAIRR covering13

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

4 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS16800 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
163.199.253.0/24/24AFRINIC
168.142.72.0/24/24AFRINIC
168.142.131.0/24/24AFRINIC
192.96.146.0/24/24AFRINIC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

7 objects · 7 not announced

Route objects naming AS16800 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
163.199.0.0/16AFRINICNedbank IP Block 1NBL1-MNT2024-04-07Not announced
163.199.253.0/24AFRINICNB-LON-LINXNBL1-MNT2026-04-01Not announced
163.201.0.0/16AFRINICNedbank IP Block 2NBL1-MNT2024-04-15Not announced
168.142.72.0/24NTTCOMInternet Solutions (Pty) Ltd (South Africa)MAINT-AS37412026-07-10Not announced
168.142.72.0/24RADBInternet Solutions (Pty) Ltd (South Africa)MAINT-AS37412026-07-10Not announced
168.142.131.0/24NTTCOMInternet Solutions (Pty) Ltd (South Africa)MAINT-AS37412026-07-10Not announced
168.142.131.0/24RADBInternet Solutions (Pty) Ltd (South Africa)MAINT-AS37412026-07-10Not announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS16800 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-16800AFRINICLists AS16800 as a direct member
AS-IS-INTRADBLists AS16800 as a direct member
AS-ISZARADBLists AS16800 as a direct member
AS-SWAZIAFRINICLists AS16800 as a direct member
AS-UDOSRADBLists AS16800 as a direct member
AS3741:AS-IS-INTNTTCOMLists AS16800 as a direct member
AS3741:AS-ISZANTTCOMLists AS16800 as a direct member
AS63529:AS-63529-AS-IMPORT-AS23764APNICLists AS16800 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-13 12:16 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-13. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.