Autonomous system
AS16569 DMZ
Unclassified ARIN
Summary
City of Calgary
government business infrastructure
The AS handle is not a name at all. It is the security term for the part of a network exposed to outsiders.
What it's used for
- A city government's network. Two IPv4 prefixes announced from Canada, no IPv6, five hundred and twelve addresses, through three observed BGP neighbours.
Notable
- The AS handle is three letters naming a demilitarised zone: the segment a network puts between itself and the internet. It says what the number carries, not who runs it.
- Both netnames repeat that: the city's initials, the same three letters, and then the block's own address written with hyphens.
- The two blocks sit on unrelated ranges and are the entire holding, both registered to the city itself.
- One of six queried addresses answered, with a single word naming a violent weather system, on the city's public domain.
- Three observed neighbours carry two blocks.
Interesting
- Naming an AS number after the function of the addresses inside it is rare and useful. Most handles say who; this one says what, and anybody reading the routing table learns that these addresses are the outward-facing ones by design.
- Repeating the same three letters in every netname turns the whole record into one statement: this is the edge, and nothing behind it is here.
- A single host name on a city network, and it is a weather word. Municipal machines get named by people, not by generators, and the naming survives every reorganisation that renames the department.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| YYCIX Calgary Internet Exchange | Calgary, Canada | 206.126.225.25 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-26, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 2 prefixes · 512 addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| CA | Canada | 2 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- ARIN
- Handle
AS16569- Registry name
- DMZ
- Registrant
- City of Calgary
- Abuse contact
- cody.harbidge@calgary.ca
- Registered
- 2006-09-27
- Last changed
- 2025-05-28
- Allocation
- assigned
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 2 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS16569
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 50% registered · 1 of 2 announcements 1 other origin
- Route objects
- 1 naming AS16569
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 445 networks and 1,817 prefixes, as published 2026-10-27. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere