asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS16371 ACENS_AS Spain Hosting, housing and VPN services

Hosting RIPE

IPv4 addresses 89.34K 52 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 1 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly ES
Exchanges 2 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 4 1 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

acens Technologies

Spain · AI-generated

hosting isp business

The AS handle is not a label. It is a country, a comma, and a list of the three services on offer.

What it's used for

  • A hosting provider's network. Fifty-three prefixes announced from Spain, one of them IPv6, eighty-nine thousand three hundred and forty-four addresses, through ten observed BGP neighbours.

Notable

  • The AS handle joins the brand to the letters for an autonomous system with an underscore, then adds a country and three services separated by commas. It reads as advertising copy.
  • Most blocks use a country code, the brand, and a full date, with dates spread over seven years.
  • Two use the brand alone. One is named after a national carrier instead, and is registered to that carrier's administrators and technical staff.
  • The abuse contact splits by family. The dated blocks name the company itself; the undated ones and the carrier's block name a fourth brand's abuse team.
  • The same three contacts appear on most blocks in two different orders, so the listing order is not meaningful.
  • Five of eighteen queried addresses answered. Three carry the address hyphenated, a word for networks, and the provider's domain. Two are customer machines on unrelated domains, one of which begins with a number.

Interesting

  • Selling hosting means somebody else's hostnames live on your addresses. Two answers in this sample name a mail server and a directory server on domains the registry has never heard of.
  • A registry handle used as a sales pitch dates from when these fields were read by humans. Nothing validates it, so it survives.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

Recorded at 2 exchanges in 1 country, largest first.

ExchangeLocationTheir address
ESpanix Madrid Lower LANMadrid, Spain193.149.1.40
Catalunya Neutral Internet Exchange PointBarcelona, Spain193.242.98.9

Transit providers

4 upstream, 1 downstream and 6 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS3352TELEFONICA DE ESPANA S.A.U.6,637
AS3303Swisscom (Schweiz) AG203
AS6453TATA COMMUNICATIONS (AMERICA) INC32
AS13030Init7 (Switzerland) Ltd.1

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-13, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 52 prefixes · 89.34K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
ESSpain53

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS16371
Registry name
acens_AS
Registrant
ACENS-MNT
Abuse contact
abuse@acens.net
Registered
2002-08-22
Last changed
2025-05-21
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
96% valid · 112 valid, 5 with no ROA
ROAs
107 authorising AS16371
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 117 of 117 announcements
Route objects
84 naming AS16371

Reputation

Classification and threat

Hosting Datacenter or cloud provider. Addresses are servers, not people.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 436 networks and 1,771 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check