Autonomous system
AS16350 ECHELON-AS Institutenweg 38
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
Root Holding
hosting isp business
Technical questions go to one brand, complaints go to another, and the AS handle is a street address.
What it's used for
- A hosting company's network. Three prefixes announced from the Netherlands, one of them IPv6, five thousand one hundred and twenty addresses, through fifty-two observed BGP neighbours.
Notable
- The AS handle is a brand, the letters for an autonomous system, then a street name and a house number. The routing label records where the equipment is.
- The holder is a different brand entirely, a single word plus a legal form, and that word is also what both netnames use.
- Each block lists four contacts. Three of them, the company, its administrators and its technical contacts, use the holder's brand. The fourth, the abuse contact, uses the handle's brand.
- Both netnames follow one scheme: a country code, the holder's brand, and a full date. The two dates are eleven years apart and the format did not change.
- Fifty-two observed neighbours on five thousand addresses is ten times the peering the network's size would suggest.
- Six addresses were queried for reverse DNS and none returned a name.
Interesting
- Splitting contacts by brand, technical under one name and abuse under another, usually means two businesses share infrastructure and only one of them wants the complaints.
- A single word as a company name is a claim about the top of a hierarchy. It also makes the registry entry impossible to search for, which every other field in this record quietly works around.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| Neutral Internet Exchange | Amsterdam, Netherlands | 193.239.118.49 |
Transit providers
14 upstream, 0 downstream and 23 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-16, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 2 prefixes · 5.12K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| NL | Netherlands | 3 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS16350- Registry name
- ECHELON-AS
- Registrant
- ECHELON-MNT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@root.nl
- Registered
- 2002-09-20
- Last changed
- 2019-03-15
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 3 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 3 authorising AS16350
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 3 of 3 announcements
- Route objects
- 3 naming AS16350
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,783 prefixes, as published 2026-10-17. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere