asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS16322 PARSONLINE Tehran - IRAN

Unclassified APNIC

IPv4 addresses 59.90K 38 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly IR
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 1 5 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

ParsOnline

Iran · AI-generated

isp telecom hosting

On four blocks the registrant field holds an abuse role, so the record names a mailbox where the owner should be.

What it's used for

  • A national provider's network. Thirty-eight IPv4 prefixes announced from Iran, no IPv6, sixty thousand one hundred and sixty addresses, through seven observed BGP neighbours.

Notable

  • The AS handle is the brand, then a city, then a country, so the routing label carries a postal address.
  • Two naming families run through the blocks. One uses a country code, a four-letter cut of the brand and a full date, with dates spread over eight years. The other names a second company, either through its initials and a date or through a longer brand with a numeral appended.
  • Four blocks of that second family list only an abuse role as registrant. The field that should name the owner names the mailbox that handles complaints about it.
  • Three of eighteen queried addresses answered. Each name is the four numbers of the address in order, dots and all, with the provider's domain appended.
  • Two of those three are the first and last addresses of their block, the ones conventionally reserved as network and broadcast, and both answer anyway.

Interesting

  • Prepending the dotted address to a domain is the laziest possible reverse zone. It is generated once, covers everything, and tells you nothing the address had not already told you.
  • Two companies sharing one autonomous system, with one of them recorded only by its abuse contact, is what a merger looks like before anyone updates the paperwork.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

1 upstream, 5 downstream and 7 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS42440Rayaneh Danesh Golestan Complex P.J.S. Co.1,627

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-18, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 38 prefixes · 59.90K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
IRIran (Islamic Republic of)38

Registry

Allocation record

APNIC · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
APNIC
Handle
AS16322
Registry name
PARSONLINE
Registrant
Parsan Lin Co. PJS
Abuse contact
abuse@parsonline.com
Registered
1970-01-01
Last changed
2024-10-21
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
100% valid · 27 valid, 0 with no ROA
ROAs
87 authorising AS16322
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 27 of 27 announcements
Route objects
157 naming AS16322

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 443 networks and 1,784 prefixes, as published 2026-10-19. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check