asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS16301 DATACOM-AS Novgorod Datacom LLC

Unclassified RIPE

IPv4 addresses 78.59K 18 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly RU
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 1 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Rostelecom

Russian Federation · AI-generated

telecom isp transit

Eight opaque letters carrying the registry's own role suffixes, listed on half the blocks.

What it's used for

  • A carrier's regional network. Eighteen IPv4 prefixes announced from the Russian Federation, no IPv6, seventy-eight thousand five hundred and ninety-two addresses, through one observed BGP neighbour.

Notable

  • Two netname schemes split the blocks. Four use a country code, three letters for the carrier, and a full date. Seven use a regional brand and the word for a network, with no date at all.
  • Several blocks list two roles whose labels are the same eight-letter string followed by the registry's internal names for administrative and technical contacts. The database's own field names are showing through into the human-readable record.
  • Those eight letters appear in no other field and expand to nothing the record explains.
  • The blocks with the regional brand list only the carrier's technical team, while the dated blocks list four contacts each.
  • The AS handle is the regional brand, the letters for an autonomous system, and then a city with the brand and a legal suffix, which is the only place the operator's own name appears in full.
  • Eighteen addresses were queried for reverse DNS and none returned a name.

Interesting

  • Role handles that leak the registry's schema are a sign of records created by tooling rather than by hand. Somebody scripted the contact objects and named them after the field they fill.
  • Seventy-eight thousand addresses behind one observed upstream is a regional network that reaches the rest of the internet entirely through its parent.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS12389PJSC Rostelecom310

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-11, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 18 prefixes · 78.59K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
RURussian Federation18

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS16301
Registry name
DATACOM-AS
Registrant
PJSC Rostelecom
Abuse contact
abuse@rt.ru
Registered
2002-09-05
Last changed
2024-12-19
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
100% valid · 5 valid, 0 with no ROA
ROAs
5 authorising AS16301
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 5 of 5 announcements
Route objects
5 naming AS16301

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 432 networks and 1,768 prefixes, as published 2026-10-12. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check